

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

ADB029124

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FROM:

Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies only; Proprietary Information; 10 AUG 1978. Other requests shall be referred to Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112.

AUTHORITY

AWC ltr dtd 19 Sep 1978

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

LEVEL II

(2)



Air War College

AD B029124

AD NO. _____
DDC FILE COPY

6 A HISTORY OF WING-BASE ORGANIZATION
AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CHANGE.

7 **RESEARCH
REPORT.**

14 RR No. 474

By Gary D./Sheets

10

11 Apr 78

12 153 p.

DDC
RECEIVED
MAY 10 1978
ALBANY, NY

AIR WAR COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

PII Redacted

014 550

78 08 07 147

Clearance for public release of this document under the provisions of AFR 190-17 has not been accomplished.

A copy of this document may be obtained for official use by requesting the study by number (see front cover) from the Air University Library Interlibrary Loan Service, AUTOVON 874-7223, commercial (205) 293-7223.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER 474	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) A History of Wing-Base Organization and Considerations for Change		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Research Report
7. AUTHOR(s) LTC Gary D. Sheets		6. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS AWC/EDRM Maxwell AFB AL 36112		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Commandant Air War College Maxwell AFB AL 36112		12. REPORT DATE April 1978
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 150
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCL
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) B. US GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ONLY (Proprietary Information)		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) See Attached		

10 AUG 1978

AIR WAR COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY

REPORT NO. 474

A HISTORY OF WING-BASE ORGAN-
IZATION AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CHANGE

by

Gary D. Sheets, [REDACTED]
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

[PII Redacted]

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

April 1978

78 08 07 147

This research report represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Air War College or the Department of the Air Force.

This document is the property of the United States Government and is not to be reproduced in whole or in part without permission of the Commandant, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Biographical Sketch

Lieutenant Colonel Gary D. Sheets (M.B.A., Florida Technological University) has served in a variety of operational and staff assignments within Air Defense Command (ADC), Tactical Air Command (TAC), and Strategic Air Command (SAC). Most recently he completed a tour as Deputy Base Commander, 449th BW, Kincheloe AFB, Michigan. Colonel Sheets is a graduate of the United States Air Force Academy, 1960; Squadron Officer's School, 1964; Industrial College of the Armed Forces (correspondence), 1973; the Armed Forces Staff College, 1974; and of the Air War College, Class of 1978.

ACCESSION for	
NTIS	White Section <input type="checkbox"/>
DDC	Buff Section <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
UNANNOUNCED	<input type="checkbox"/>
JUSTIFICATION	
BY	
DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY	
DATE	
B	

AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT SUMMARY
No. 474

TITLE: A History of Wing-Base Organization and Considerations For Change

AUTHOR: Gary D. Sheets, Lt. Colonel, USAF

→ The historical evolution of the wing-base organization is traced from 1925 to the current time. A documentation of events, the perceptions of military and civilian leaders, and views of the author provide a background for understanding the frequent reorganizations which have occurred and which have always been targeted at furthering the employment of airpower. The potential loss of the Air Force organizational, corporate memory and a lack of explicit organizational feedback are seen as the main drawbacks to accomplishing future restructuring in a reasoned manner. This study provides both a single historical record and a sampling of the attitudes of key personnel regarding the sufficiency of the existing wing-base organization. Areas of organizational dissatisfactions are identified and further action by HQ USAF is recommended.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
DISCLAIMER-ABSTAINER.	ii
SUMMARY	iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH	iv
I INTRODUCTION.	1
II ORGANIZATION UNDER THE ARMY	4
From Squadron to Group.	4
GHQAF Wing-Base Organization.	6
Dual Commanders Overseas.	10
In Summary.	11
III THE WING-BASE REORGANIZATION OF 1947.	13
Last Minute Preparations.	13
Implementation of the Wing-Base Plan.	14
Field Test Results.	18
In Conclusion	21
IV 1948-1955: EVOLUTION OF ORGANIZATIONAL DOCTRINE.	23
Adjustments to the Initial Wing-Base Plan	23
Emphasis on Organizational Stability.	29
Scrapping of the Wing-Base Plan by ADC.	31
SAC Elimination of Maint & Suppoly Gp.	32
1953 Refinement of Principles and Policies	34
Other Advocated Changes	35
In Conclusion	36
V 1955-1961: STREAMLINING THE WING-BASE STRUCTURE	38
AFR 20-15 of 1955	38
Organizational Doctrine	39
Organizational Forms.	40
Organizational Changes: 1956-1961	45
TAC Air Division Concept: 1957.	46
SAC Dual Deputy Concept: 1958	49
USAFE Tri-Deputy Concept: 1959.	53
In Conclusion	55
VI USAF DUAL DEPUTY CONCEPT: 1962-1973	56
AFM 26-2 of 1964.	56
Principles.	57
Policies.	59

	Objectives.	60
	Wing-Base Organization.	61
	TAC's Quest for Decentralized Maintenance	65
	In Conclusion	68
VII	ORGANIZATION DURING THE 1970's.	70
	The Tri-Deputy Concept.	70
	Other Changes	74
	Creation of MWR	75
	Social Actions.	75
	POMO.	76
	Proposals Not Adopted	79
	In Conclusion	80
VIII	CONSIDERATIONS FOR CHANGE	81
	MAJCOM Perceptions.	81
	Base Perceptions.	82
	Q-2: Fulfillment of Organizational	
	Goals	83
	Q-3: Fulfillment of Organizational	
	Principles.	84
	Q-4: Satisfaction With the Tri-Deputy	
	Structure	85
	Q-5: Workload and Career Progression. .	86
	Q-6: Recommended Organizational	
	Changes	87
	In Summary.	90
	Conclusions	91
	Recommendations	94
	NOTES	95
	BIBLIOGRAPHY.	109
	APPENDIX A: Copy of Survey	117
	APPENDIX B: Analysis of Survey Results . .	120

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure		Page
3-1	Wing-Base Organization for 1947.	16
3-2	Wing-Base Organization, Group Structures for 1947.	17
4-1	Wing-Base Organization for 1948.	24
4-2	Maintenance and Supply Group: 1948	25
4-3	Air Base Group: 1948	26
4-4	SAC Reorganization of 1951	33
5-1	Combat Wing Organization: 1955	41
5-2	Combat Wing Organization, Dual Group Bases: 1955.	43
5-3	Base-Operating Group Organization: 1955.	44
5-4	TAC Air Division Concept: 1957	48
5-5	SAC Dual Deputy Organization: 1958	50
5-6	SAC Dual Deputy Organization, Combat Support Group: 1958	52
5-7	USAFE Tri-Deputy Test: 1959.	54
6-1	Wing/Gp Organization Structure, Single Wing/Group Base: 1964	62
6-2	Support Gp/Sq Organization Structure, Single Wing/Gp Base: 1964.	63
7-1	USAFE Tri-Deputy Organization: 1974.	71
7-2	Production Oriented Maintenance Organization (POMO).	78

LIST OF TABLES

Table		
8-1	Q-2: Fulfillment of Organizational Goals .	83
8-2	Q-3: Fulfillment of Organizational Principles.	84
8-3	Q-4: Satisfaction With the Tri-Deputy Structure	85
8-4	Q-5: Wing Commander Rating of Job Workload.	87
8-5	Q-5: Rating of Career Perceptions.	87
8-6	Q-6: Recommended Changes	88
8-7	Q-6: % of Respondents Recommending CSG/CC to Deputy Commander Status.	88
8-8	Q-6: % of Respondents Recommending Elimination of DCR	89
8-9	Q-6: % of Respondents Recommending Reassignment of DCR and CSG Functions.	90

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A generation which ignores history has no past--and no future.¹

Personal involvement with organizational matters has made one fact obvious: nearly everyone has his own concept of "how" a unit should be organized, but few have displayed any depth of understanding, including this author, of how or why the organizational structure evolved to its existing form. This is not to cast aspersions upon those involved in organizational matters; their understanding should not be expected to exceed that contained in the available documented record. Rather, the accusation of limited knowledge is aimed at the corporate record itself. Research has confirmed that organizational matters are too frequently relegated to the archives of the historian, in dispersed form and far removed in time and space from the commander or staff officer who has a real-time need to conceive or coordinate an organizational proposal.

A second deficiency is the lack of research feedback on the adequacy of the existing wing-base structure. This fact was recently confirmed when the Leadership and Management Development Center was asked to comment on a major command (MAJCOM) proposal submitted

to the USAF Chief of Staff recommending that the role of the base commander be redefined. As acknowledged by the senior officer tasked with evaluating the proposal, "My comments are very subjective; they are not based on any validated research data. To the best of my knowledge, none exists at this time."²

The importance accorded correction of these deficiencies rest with the recognition of the historical intertwining of air employment doctrine with that of organizational principles, policies, and objectives. This was particularly true before the Air Force gained autonomy as a separate service. Perhaps the organizational structure under the Army did not limit the employment of airpower, although many would argue differently, but it certainly so dominated the thought processes during daily difficulties that it had to impinge upon the time available for futuristic conceptual thinking. Moreover, this conflict between employment doctrine and organizational structure has not been confined to the period when the Air Force was part of the Army.

As recently as the mid-sixties, such a doctrinal conflict occurred. The tactical forces discovered that their ability to deploy to South East Asia on short notice was considerably constrained by organizational

shortcomings.³ As at the beginning of World War II, it was agreed that, in the face of enemy conflict, it was not the time to reorganize. And this is likely to be true in the future--we will fight with the organization existing at the outbreak of hostilities.

This study endeavors to remedy the deficiencies of record and data. Herein, the organizational experience of the Air Force since 1925 is traced to the present. This is followed by an assessment of the adequacy of the current organizational structure for combat, aircraft wings by analyzing the survey replies of key wing-base personnel. Hopefully, this record will serve as a catalyst for further documentation and study of organization as a means of furthering the employment of airpower.

CHAPTER II

ORGANIZATION UNDER THE ARMY

During the embryonic years of aviation, the organizational seeds for an evolving separate Air Force were to be found at post level. The first basic aviation organizational unit to be established was that of a squadron.

From Squadron to Group

Officially recognized in 1925,* the squadron was organized in parallel form with that of an army company.¹ As such, the squadron commander was tasked with the same responsibilities as a company commander: administration, instruction, tactical efficiency and preparedness for war service. Each squadron was assigned the necessary personnel to accomplish these tasks; the general welfare of assigned personnel was the responsibility of the squadron commander. When the squadron was garrisoned with a larger army unit, which it normally was, the post commander provided the necessary house-keeping and logistical support. However, regulations did make provision for the absence of a general mess, at which time it became the responsibility of the squadron officers and NCOs to oversee the food preparation.

*Squadrons and groups were formed as early as WW I. However, available regulations only date back to 1925.

In either case, hunting was encouraged to supplement unit rations and the squadron commander was authorized to pay for the ammunition out of squadron funds.²

As the number of squadrons increased, the combat group was conceived as a supervisory organization.³ Normally, one combat group was formed per airfield. To each group were assigned two or more tactical squadrons, as well as sufficient service elements to insure independent operations.⁴ For example, each squadron possessed an organic capability to perform first and second echelon maintenance, and the combat group, third echelon maintenance. These three echelons equate to those functions performed by today's wing/maintenance complex as well as a portion of those performed at depot level. When the combat group was assigned as the sole occupant of an airfield, the commander assumed all logistical responsibilities attendant with running an installation. For the first time at base level, the primary air tactical commander was also the base commander, although the term "base commander" had not yet been coined. He in turn reported singularly to the next higher level army tactical commander.⁵ From all indications, unity of command and lines of authority were satisfactorily established for the scope of operations at that time. This would not be the case in the

reorganization that was soon to follow.

GHQAF Wing-Base Organization

Insistent demands for separate command and control of aviation units led to the establishment of General Headquarters Air Force (GHQAF) by the War Department on 1 March 1935.⁶ The implementing letter was quite specific as to GHQAF being responsible to a higher headquarters, but was vague regarding unit organizational lines of authority below that level. GHQAF was responsible for forming and supervising the tactical organizations comprised of squadrons, combat groups, and wings. Conversely, command of the installation and logistical support was the responsibility of the Army Corp area commander. The installation was to be commanded by the senior officer assigned and logistical support was to be provided through a station complement consisting of units from the Air Corp, Quartermaster, Ordnance, Signal Corp, Medical, and other service personnel.⁷ Hence, on every station there were effectively three separate commanders--wing, base, and station complement--all of whom reported separately, but none of whom was in overall command. However, this was to be only a test organizational structure and comments/recommendations for a more effective organizational form were to be submitted to the War Department by 1 February 1936.⁸

From its inception, this test organization yielded unsatisfactory results. The multiplicity of loyalties, overlapping responsibilities, and divergent lines of authority led to numerous disputes.⁹ General Andrews, Commander of GHQAF, submitted an early report regarding the unsatisfactory test results,¹⁰ and on 8 May 1936 all Air Force stations were exempted from corp area control, except for court martial jurisdiction.¹¹

Although the exemption would later be withdrawn, a brief opportunity was provided for GHQAF to unilaterally develop a more effective wing-base organizational structure.

The structure conceived by GHQAF in 1936 eliminated most of the previous dissatisfactions. The station complement was reorganized under the base commander, the combat group was retained as the supervisory tactical unit, and the wing commander was placed in overall command.¹² Because Army regulations still dictated that the base commander be the senior officer assigned to the installation, special instructions were issued by GHQAF which established the wing commander-base commander relationship.

The bases having been placed under Wing control, the Base Commander, the senior officer present, is the direct representative of the Wing Commander. The Base Commander should therefore supervise the training of the tactical units

assigned to his base, and see that the training programs prescribed by the Wing are carried out--this does not, however, involve the issuance by the Base Commander of detailed training programs or training schedules, but does require supervision and inspection, and the full utilization of Group Commanders and their staffs.

The Base Commander is therefore in the chain of command, as required above, for the training and operations of tactical units assigned to his base, except when such units are detached by higher authority.¹³

Although this arrangement was more satisfactory than the previous structure whereby the base commander and service complement reported separately to the Army Corp area commander, it was still felt that chain of command and training constraints should be placed on the base commander. In a policy letter of 26 April 1937, General Andrews further defined the duties of his commanders:¹⁴

Wing commanders' duties are primarily tactical. They are charged with the command planning, supervision, coordination, direction, and inspection of all air bases, base troops, and combat units, assigned or attached to their wings. They will not act as station, post, or base commanders, but are stationed at their present bases for domiciliary purposes.

.

Group and squadron commanders' duties are primarily to conduct operations and the training therefore....In addition, they are responsible for the messing, supply, and first echelon of maintenance of their units....

Base commanders are charged with the duties of commanding officers of posts, camps, and stations as prescribed in AR 210-70. Such duties include the provision of the ser-

vices and operation of the installations and facilities required for the operation.... pursuant to policies and instructions of wing commanders....

During the temporary absence from command of the wing commander, the senior flying officer present for duty in the wing shall assume command of the wing. During similar absences of base, group, or squadron commanders, the senior flying officer permanently present for duty in the base, group, or squadron, respectively, shall assume command of that activity....

This placement of the wing commander in overall command of the base and its assigned units was to be short lived. In a War Department letter of 8 December 1937, the issue was addressed.

Certain questions have arisen pertaining to command responsibilities within GHQ Air Force... It is essential that the possibility of conflict between duties of wing commanders and those prescribed for post commanders be reduced to a minimum. To this end it is proposed that the War Department issue instructions prescribing the duties of wing commanders....¹⁵

War Department concern for control over GHQAF also extended to the use of the term "base."

It is noted in certain instances reference has been made to GHQ Air Force stations as "Air Bases" and to the post commanders as "Air Base Commanders." The designation of GHQ Air Force stations as air bases has not been authorized.¹⁶

The central issue clearly was not which was the most effective wing-base organization, but rather growing concerns, at the highest Army levels, for controlling an emerging separate Air Force. Hence, it was no surprise when Army Corp area control over GHQAF bases was rein-

stituted in 1940.¹⁷ After Pearl Harbor, sentiment was high in the air arm for independence, but General Arnold and his advisors realized that a change in organization during wartime would be extremely difficult and hazardous.¹⁸ So throughout the war, the most prevalent state-side base organization was that of base commander, service group, and combat group.¹⁹ A different organizational structure, however, was utilized in the combat theaters.

Dual Commanders Overseas

Perhaps it is understandable that the identity of base commander was not an issue at the forward combat bases. Most prevalent on each overseas base was an organization consisting of two groups--the combat group and the services group.²⁰ The combat group commander was designated the base commander, but he was not given technical nor administrative control over the service group. The combat group was under the control of the Air Force and the service group under the control of the Army Corp area commander. In 1942 the Air Service Command was formed within Army Air Forces and it assumed command and control over the service groups, then redesignated the air service groups.²¹ Although each group commander reported to different higher headquarters, the organizational arrangement was extremely

flexible, and permitted each unit to concentrate on its assigned mission.²² As viewed by one former fighter combat group commander:

As my group leapfrogged across Europe, the next base was always ready and supplies in-place. The air service group knew what they were to do and they did it. Only once do I remember any difficulty; one squadron was short of gas and could not launch all of its aircraft for a Berlin escort mission. I don't know why we were short of gas, but I held the squadron commander responsible for not letting me know.²³

Broader opinion expressed by commanders after the war, however, was that there needed to be a greater unity of command at base level. Toward this end, on 12 December 1945, the War Department placed the base commander over the combat group and the air service group on each station; the wing structure was generally not used. The base commander, in turn, reported to the next higher Air Force tactical commander. This organizational form remained until the Air Force became an autonomous service in July 1947.²⁴

In Summary

The base organizational form which evolved for the air arm while under the Army was driven by many opposing forces. The predominate conflict ensued from the Air Force desiring complete control of its tactical and logistical units, which it felt was necessary in order to fulfill its mission. The Army, on the other hand, was

reluctant to allow such independent operation in light of the larger issue of the Air Force becoming a separate service. Since tactical air operations necessitated control by qualified airmen, this left base command and logistical support as the primary means by which the Army could exercise a semblance of control. It was not until the organizational form was combat-tested and autonomy for the Air Force was imminent that the War Department conceded to there being one commander in overall command of base units, and he in turn, responsible to higher Air Force control. It was from this base of experience that the first Air Force wing-base plan would evolve in 1947.

CHAPTER III

THE WING-BASE REORGANIZATION OF 1947

In planning for a post-war Air Force, General Arnold formed a special project group in 1944 to develop a new base organizational plan. His vision was to standardize the organization of all Air Force units whereby they would be grouped by functional tasks.¹ At the conclusion of nearly two years of study, the basic theory of the new wing-base plan was briefed to the AAF Commander's Conference held at Shaw Field in July 1946.² In its skeletal form, the plan embraced a wing headquarters as the principal command/supervisory unit over four operational groups. At the time, it was little more than theory, for broad field testing continued to be restrained by the War Department. Still, it was a start, and it became known as the Hobson Plan--taking its name from that of the project chairman and briefer, Colonel Kenneth Hobson.

Last Minute Preparations

1947 dawned as the year of greater organizational freedom as the issue of a separate Air Force came closer to becoming a reality. In fact, the loosening of organizational bindings promulgated considerable organizational experimentation and instability. For example, during the first six months of that year Strategic Air

Command implemented, in varying degrees, seven different organizational forms. Results were generally inconclusive, however, because of the brief tenure of each test.³

During this same period, HQ AAF continued to develop the Hobson Plan. MacDill Field was selected for field testing of the concept but the collection of useful data was overtaken by events.⁴ In June of 1947 the War Department gave the green light for the AAF to effect sweeping organizational change.⁵ An AAF survey team was quickly dispatched to Shaw Field to ascertain what changes to manning and equipment documents would be required.⁶ Then on 27 June, AAF Regulation 20-15 prescribing a standard organizational pattern for all AAF bases was published and distributed.⁷ Undoubtedly, AAF leaders were aware of the minimal preparations that had been taken up to that time, but the desire to control their organizational destiny outweighed any advantages of further delay.

Implementation of the Wing-Base Plan

AAF Regulation 20-15 set forth a wing organization to accomplish all functions then being performed by three separate entities--the combat group, the air service group, and the permanent party (base commander) organization. The new wing-base organization, as depicted


in Figures 3-1 and 3-2, consisted of a wing headquarters which was authorized a Brigadier General as commander, and a staff of 14 officers plus enlisted personnel. The wing commander was tasked with overall command and staff jurisdiction of all assigned components consisting of: a combat group, a maintenance and supply group, an airdrome group, and a station hospital or medical group. These groups were in turn responsible for command supervision of assigned squadrons.⁸

Conceptual guidance and rationale for the reorganization was sketchy to non-existent. No organizational goals, objectives, or principles were referenced in the regulation nor were functional responsibilities identified other than those implied by unit name and functional assignment.⁹ What was stated included: organizing the squadrons of the support groups into three identical work sections for potential mobility deployment with any of the three combat squadrons, and stipulation that each unit would be administratively self-supporting and operate with identical administrative and command channels.¹⁰ As would soon be learned, what was intended by the regulation was open for individual interpretation.

Although AAF Regulation 20-15 was published in June of 1947, the specific manning guidance required to im-


Figure 3-1

WING -BASE ORGANIZATION FOR 1947
(Combat or ATC Station)



SOURCE: AFR 20-15, 27 June 1947.

Figure 3-2
WING-BASE ORGANIZATION FOR 1947



SOURCE: AFR 20-15, 27 June 1947.

plement the reorganization was delayed. Following the four-day AAF manpower survey at Shaw Field in May, an AAF-wide manpower conference was convened at Langley Field on 1 July.¹¹ Major Command (MAJCOM) participants were briefed on the sketchy Hobson Plan and were then instructed to submit manpower requirements for all units within their command by 7 July 1947. This formidable task was accomplished as suspended, results were tabulated by HQ AAF, and the compilation was then issued to the field in directive form on 15 August. Understandably, there were major errors of omission and commission which, when added to the tardiness of the guidance, both delayed and confused implementation.¹²

Field Test Results

In spite of these administrative and staffing deficiencies, early reports of the ninety-day field test generally favored the plan. The new wing organization was widely credited with improving morale and discipline.¹³ The improvement was felt to stem mainly from elimination of Base Squadron A which previously served as a 500-1000 manpower pool from which workers were detailed to other installation units.¹⁴ Now, personnel were permanently assigned to smaller, functionally-aligned squadrons, which enabled commanding officers to take a more personal interest in both the men and their

jobs.

While sentiment greatly favored the plan, there were problems. Generally, the deficiencies cited by field units could be grouped into three areas: manning deficiencies, inappropriate organizational assignments, and confusion concerning who was the base commander. Specific comments, representative of those recorded included:

1. Assignment of combat crewmembers to part-time base administrative duties detracted from combat readiness and unit mobility.¹⁵

2. New organization required more manpower because of retreat from centralized specialized support.¹⁶

3. Major General Old, Commander of TAC's 9th AF, recommended dissolution of the combat group and establishment of a deputy commander for operations on the wing staff. He also felt that the airdrome group commander should be designated as the base commander with duties in concert with wing commander policies.¹⁷

4. The 1st Fighter Wing proposed that the deputy wing commander become the base commander in order to relieve the wing commander of routine duties which detracted from tactical responsibilities.¹⁸

5. Brigadier General Lee, Deputy Commander of TAC, recommended that functional responsibilities required clarification, and that an amplified policy for func-

tions should be published by HQ AAF.¹⁹

Lieutenant General Quesada, the Commander of TAC, acknowledged in a letter that many specific problems were indeed present but he believed that many of them were directly attributable to inappropriate actions by commanders and staff members at all levels. Many commanders had misinterpreted AFR 20-15 and thereby wrongly organized. As well, staffs at all levels had caused considerable confusion through publication of conflicting regulations and other directives. His thesis was that most personnel needed an increased conceptual understanding of the underlying principles inherent in AFR 20-15.²⁰ In this same letter General Quesada wrote,

Mobility and flexibility are often forgotten because commanders cannot or will not delegate authority commensurate with responsibility. In short, there has been no concerted effort, on all levels, to adopt and retain, especially in the face of adversity, those principles which, when applied, make the Wing-Base plan workable and effective.²¹

The principles he referred to were: unity of command, span of control, homogeneous assignment, and delegation of authority. He expounded upon these principles by relating them to corrections that the AAF had aspired to when under Army authority--corrections which they had been unable to make. By means of the new base plan there existed the potential for clear-

cut and appropriate command channels; centralized control of decentralized operations; commanders being able to clothe, pay, promote, work, and administer their personnel; limiting the size of squadrons to 250 personnel; enhancing mobility and flexibility; and establishing uniformity of organization throughout the Air Force which would improve personnel assignment, progression, and training.²² In the absence of an authoritative HQ AF directive that spelled out required guidance and rationale, General Quesada urged commanders throughout TAC to become intimately familiar with the four principles he discussed. He encouraged all to apply them in every aspect of command and direction, and that raters should reflect in their reports their subordinates' successes in applying these principles. This approach in conjunction with training people in administrative and management procedures, he felt would accomplish the implicit goals of the reorganization.²³ In effect he said, the plan is good, let's make it work.

In Conclusion

In retrospect, one could justifiably criticize the lack of preparation and indoctrination which should have preceeded the reorganization. However, previous War Department restrictions had constrained organizational developments to mostly theory.²⁴ Any more aggressive

actions than those taken on the part of AAF leadership could have detracted from timely passage of the National Security Act which established the Air Force as a separate and equal service. For most of 1946, many tactical units remained subordinated to non-flying base commanders. As General Spaatz commented, this placed the primary mission commander in the untenable position of having to "negotiate" for required support.²⁵ So when eleventh hour approval to reorganize was granted by the War Department, the Air Force chose to correct immediately the long-standing organizational deficiencies. It was through the positive leadership of Generals Spaatz and Quesada, as well as other commanders and staff officers, that the Hobson Plan had any hopes for lasting success. However, the role and designation of the base commander continued to be a problem and would remain so for years to come.

CHAPTER IV

1948-1955: EVOLUTION OF ORGANIZATIONAL DOCTRINE


The Hobson Plan, for the most part, corrected the deficiencies of decreased mobility, split jurisdiction, and disunity of command, as previously discussed. But it also created a host of unforeseen problems stemming from dysfunctional alignments and an absence of organizational guidance. From the numerous field recommendations emanating from the 1947-1948 test, it was readily apparent that adjustments were in order. On the other hand, HQ USAF was intent upon minimizing change, and where change was justified, to insure that it was made Air Force-wide and in accordance with accepted organizational principles and objectives. Changes to the Hobson Plan were implemented through the publication of a new AFR 20-15.

Adjustments to the Initial Wing-Base Plan

The new AFR 20-15, published 13 December 1948, retained the basic command structure of a wing component over four operational groups.¹ There were, however, numerous functional adjustments and reassignments, as depicted in Figures 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3 which included:²

1. The airdrome group redesignated the air base group.
2. The transportation squadron redesignated the

Figure 4-1




* Responsible for organizational maintenance to include 100 hour inspections and engine changes on assigned aircraft.

** Responsible for organizational maintenance on assigned airborne communications equipment.


SOURCE: AFR 20-15, 13 Dec 48, as ammended by AFR 20-15A of 9 Jun 49 and 11 Jun 52.

Figure 4-2



SOURCE: AFR 20-15, 13 Dec 48, as amended by AFRs 20-15A of 9 Jun 49 and 11 Jun 52.

Figure 4-3



SOURCE: AFR 20-15, 13 Dec 48, as ammended by AFRs 20-15A of 9 Jun 49 and 11 Jun 52.

motor vehicle squadron and reassigned from the air base group to the maintenance and supply group.

3. The guard squadron redesignated the Air Police squadron.

4. The food servicing squadron redesignated the food service squadron.

5. The general service squadron redesignated the base service squadron.

6. Base operations and the photo lab removed from the air base group headquarters squadron and established as operating sections.

7. Personnel services, civilian personnel, purchasing and contracting, officers' club and transient officer billeting, base housing, and postal established as separate operating sections within the air base group.

8. Budget-fiscal and finance removed from the air base group and consolidated under the comptroller on the wing commander's staff.

9. Designation of the wing commander as the base commander. The wing commander was authorized to delegate any or all of his base administrative duties to an appropriate staff officer or group commander. He could not, however, delegate:

...those duties which by Articles of War, appropriation acts, or other statutory provisions are imposed on the base commander.³

As well as correcting many of the dysfunctional alignments, the new regulation also attempted to answer the criticism of insufficient conceptual guidance. By so doing, it specified organizational details for each level of organization.⁴ Units were then able to ascertain not only "what" they were to do but "how" to organize for accomplishment. Additionally, conceptual understanding of the "why" was embodied in an enumeration of the following "Wing Organizational Principles:"

- Establishes clean-cut command channels.
- Eliminates split jurisdiction and/or responsibility.
- Provides for strong central control with decentralized operations.
- Provides actual command positions for company grade officers.
- Individuals will be clothed, housed, paid, promoted, worked, and administered by their commander.
- Limits size of basic functional units to a maximum of 250.
- Provides for necessary mobility and flexibility.⁵

Under the new organization, the wing was perceived as being an organization designed for both peace and war which was self-sufficient and capable of sustained and effective action.⁶

Through comparison, it is readily apparent that most of the organizational principles were borrowed from General Quesada's letter of 6 October 1948.⁷ However, in their extracted form, much of the organizational and conceptual clarity was lost. Apparently,

the immediate publication of AFR 20-15 was primarily intended to correct functional and staff alignments; expansion of the organizational theory of goals and principles could follow at a later time.

Emphasis on Organizational Stability

Whereas organizational experimentation was the norm for the 1947-1948 time frame, change subsequent to publication of AFR 20-15 in December 1948 was discouraged. For example, in August of 1949 Strategic Air Command (SAC) published and implemented SACR 66-12 without HQ USAF coordination.⁸ This regulation reorganized the maintenance functions within the wing by: centralizing maintenance control; consolidating people, facilities, and equipment; and realigning responsibilities for crew chiefs.⁹ Although many of these changes would later be adopted in some fashion by HQ USAF, stability was seen as being the overriding consideration at that time. In a letter to SAC it was pointed out that HQ USAF had been

...exerting every effort to develop a standardized and stable base level organization which may be applied Air Force-wide. For the past two (2) years, the Wing Plan has been the means. ...SAC Regulation 66-12 clearly avoids the provisions and abrogates several vital principles of organizations outlined in Air Force Regulation 20-15 and other related regulations.¹⁰

Major General Thomas S. Power, HQ SAC, acknowledged

HQ USAF's desire for stability but still suggested that the concept be tested. Then, at the end of six months, a board could be convened to study results and to ammend AFR 20-15 accordingly.¹¹ The test was conducted and accumulated data subsequently provided a basis for a SAC reorganization in 1951, when USAF, of necessity, decreased its emphasis on organizational standardization.

This MAJCOM bent for reorganizational experimentation undoubtedly motivated publication of AFR 20-53 on 21 October 1949. This new regulation acknowledged that organization is a continuing process but more strongly it emphasized that,

Like functional elements of the Air Force will be standardized and stabilized to the maximum extent. In the case of unlike functional elements, the organizational similarity will be as close as the difference of the elements will permit.¹²

.....
...current organization must be reviewed from time to time in light of changes in mission, advanced development, the availability of new equipment and weapons, as well as the development of new concepts relating to the employment and use of available equipment and weapons.¹³

What this directive did not anticipate was reorganization forced by manpower shortages or intrinsic mission requirements which differed between commands. Both of these difficulties were encountered by the Air Defence Command (ADC).

Scrapping of the Wing-Base Plan by ADC

Shortly after the activation of ADC in January 1951, it became apparent that the wing-base plan was dysfunctional with ADC realities. Organized on a territorial basis, the command found itself top-heavy with staff personnel assigned to the intermediate headquarters at defense force, division, sector, and wing levels, while short of personnel within its squadrons.¹⁴ Likewise, Air Force policy, dictating that there be three tactical squadrons located on one base under a wing, impinged upon required dispersal of its fighter-interceptor squadrons.¹⁵ HQ USAF insistence upon wing-base organizational integrity stemmed from its anticipation of the need to rapidly deploy entire wings for the Korean War.¹⁶

Relief from this organizational imposition was forthcoming at a USAF Commander's Conference convened at Colorado Springs on 30 August 1951. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the USAF Chief of Staff, announced that MAJCOMs could deviate from the wing-base plan in the interests of greater mission effectiveness. He declared that squadrons, instead of wings, would henceforth be the primary unit for overseas deployments.¹⁷


Shortly after General Vandenberg's pronouncement, General Benjamin W. Chidlaw, Commander of ADC, declared

an intention to reorganize.¹⁸ Then on 1 February 1952, ADC implemented testing of a new base organization consisting of two commanding units--a tactical squadron and an air base group. Both commanders were established on the same level of command, neither one in over-all charge. HQ USAF was skeptical because of World War II experiences but approved the test in view of recognizable differences. However, the experiment failed. It did function successfully on some installations, but too frequently friction developed because success depended upon cooperation and good will rather than upon the principle of unity of command.¹⁹ In late 1952, ADC elected to establish an air defense group on each ADC-owned base which was in command over both the tactical and support squadrons.²⁰ This latter organizational structure remained in ADC for the remainder of the 1950s. SAC also implemented an organizational change in that time frame, but for somewhat different reasons.

SAC Elimination of Maint & Supply Gp

Faced with a need to promote more effective maintenance to meet increased alert commitments, SAC proposed a reorganization of its wings in December 1950. The plan was quickly approved and implemented in January 1951.²¹ The new organization, Figure 4-4, eliminated the intermediate maintenance and supply group

Figure 4-4
SAC REORGANIZATION OF 1951



SOURCE: History of Eighth Air Force, 1 January-30 June 1951, Volume I.

headquarters and established the three maintenance squadrons directly under the supervision of the wing commander. Concurrently, the motor vehicle squadron and the supply squadron were reassigned to the air base group.* As with ADC, HQ USAF's firm stance on a standardized organization was mollified with the reality that greater mission effectiveness and lower personnel costs might be achieved by reorganizing.

1953 Refinement of Principles and Policies

Undoubtedly the SAC and ADC reorganizational experiences influenced HQ USAF to publish AFR 20-1, another new regulation, dated 15 April 1953. This regulation superceded the stringently worded AFR 20-53, which discouraged organizational change, and replaced it with a more theoretical discourse on organizational principles and objectives.²³ The principles were those originally set forth by General Quesada: unity of command, span of control, homogeneous assignment, and delegation of authority.²⁴ These listed objectives were to:²⁵

1. Effectively and efficiently discharge the mission of the Air Force.
2. Be capable of immediate and extensive expansion to meet, without major reorganization, the requirements of a national emergency.
3. Provide a basis for increased efficiency in

*Although SAC did not request elimination of the combat group headquarters at that time, it was suggested that it be considered as a candidate for future reduction.²²

all Air Force operations and activities through the effective and economical use of allocated resources to insure that the maximum combat force is attained within available manpower resources.

4. Facilitate the development of uniform and simplified administrative doctrines, methods, and procedures.

The publication of this regulation is considered significant in the evolution of organizational doctrine and theory within the Air Force. Unlike the "organizational principles" of 1948, which in effect were attempts to rationalize and justify the reorganization at that time, these principles and objectives of 1953 were the beginnings of an organizational doctrine which remains in force to the present time.

Other Advocated Changes

In addition to the organizational changes implemented by SAC and ADC in 1951-1952, there were other advocated changes that would be adopted in some form at a later date.

In a lecture to the Air War College in 1953, Captain James R. Ognen, USN, criticized the decentralization of administrative personnel throughout the wing.²⁶ For example, each squadron maintained personnel records on each of its people. Captain Ognen felt that efficiency and work quality could both be improved by consolidation of this function. The establishment of a central base personnel office (CBPO), however, was not

to become a reality for years to come.

TAC advocated elimination of the combat group commander and his staff, thereby saving manpower by eliminating duplication in operational planning.²⁷ This same study proposed placing all maintenance squadrons and the medical squadron under the air base group.²⁸ To a degree, both of these proposals would be adopted in 1955.

Another proposal which would eventually be adopted was set forth by Major Trudeau in a 1954 professional study.²⁹ His analysis indicated that the wing commander was excessively burdened with administrative and routine support details. He advocated reorganization and reduction of the wing and group staffs and designation of the air base group commander as the base commander.³⁰ As with the Ognen proposal, this change would come, but only after a number of years had passed.

In Conclusion

The quest for a more effective wing-base structure saw the evolution of an embryonic organizational doctrine displacing HQ USAF insistence upon stability and standardization. The primary catalyst for change was the Korean War which created both increased alert commitments and manpower shortages. This forced HQ USAF to reconsider organizational changes which promised to increase combat effectiveness while decreasing personnel

overhead costs. Significant, also, was the advocacy for change through studies and academic pursuits. These proposals were not as readily recognized or adopted, perhaps because they were initiated outside of influential command and staff channels. But none-the-less, many of these same proposals would be incorporated in future reorganizations.

CHAPTER V

1955-1961: STREAMLINING THE WING-BASE STRUCTURE

Manpower shortages and differing command requirements during the early '50s forced HQ USAF to approve organizational deviations from existing regulations. This did not, however, discourage HQ USAF's drive toward a standardized, though more effective, wing-base structure. In early 1955, General Nathan F. Twining, USAF Chief of Staff, commissioned a study group to evaluate the Army, Navy, and Air Force organizational structures on a comparative, factual basis.¹ The objective of the study was to glean policies, principles, concepts, and patterns which might be refined for Air Force use. Preliminary results indicated that Air Force unity of command was good, but that span of control was too conservative.² These study deductions, plus the Korean War organizational experience, motivated HQ USAF to publish a new AFR 20-15 on 19 August 1955.

AFR 20-15 of 1955

This regulation, vis-à-vis past directives, was much more flexible and mission-oriented. The stated fundamental objectives were

...to achieve effectiveness of operation with economy of resources. This requires both standardization to the maximum extent practicable, and recognition of the operational differences inherent in the missions of the respective com-

mands that may necessitate variations in organizational structures.³

In pursuit of this concept of greater flexibility, commands were permitted, with HQ USAF approval, to place functions and units so as to optimize mission accomplishment. Equally, commands were encouraged to promote "increased organizational stability among like-type tactical units, and standardization of procedural and administrative practices within all units." These objectives were to be achieved by applying organizational doctrine, which was directive upon all commands, and by organizing units in conformance with governing administrative criteria and structural options.⁴

Organizational Doctrine. Of concern was conceptual understanding of five areas: basic units, centralization of command, intermediate echelons, composition of staffs, and administrative procedures.⁵ The basic unit was to be a squadron or a designated unit responsible for one functional area. In either case, the optimum size would normally approximate 250 people. The doctrine of centralization of command dictated that responsibility for fulfilling a primary mission must be vested in a single commander. Intermediate echelons of command were discouraged, but permissible if required for effective control. If an intermediate echelon was established,


only one overall command and supervisory staff was to be established. Staffs were to be small, representative of the unit's purpose, and restricted to those specifically required. And, overall, superficial administrative procedures and duplicatory staff practices were to be eliminated. This doctrine, in conjunction with structural criteria, was to determine the organizational form adopted by each command.

Organizational Forms. Figure 5-1 depicts a suggested structure for the equivalent of one combat group located on a single base.⁶ The combat squadrons reported directly to the wing commander, a recommendation offered by General Old in 1948.⁷ The elimination of the combat group headquarters was optional, dependent upon command analysis of mission factors.⁸

The second major change was the elimination of the maintenance and supply group headquarters and assignment of the field maintenance, motor vehicle, and supply squadrons to the air base group. The elimination of this headquarters follows, in large measure, the reorganization approved for SAC in 1951, with the exception of the maintenance elements being responsible to the air base group commander instead of to the wing commander. This removal of intermediate command echelons was most likely influenced by the 1955 study which indicated that

Figure 5-1

COMBAT WING ORGANIZATION
(1955)



SOURCE: AFR 20-15, 19 August 1955.


span of control, at that time, was too conservative. Now, all units would report to the two primary line commanders. Correspondingly, there were other organizational options.

For wings possessing two or more combat groups, the structure in Figure 5-2 was applicable.⁹ In this form, the intermediate combat group headquarters was retained and an air base squadron added to the combat group. The air base squadron was to include integrated direct and base-support elements to enhance individual group mobility. Although the composition of this squadron was not spelled out in the regulation, it is deduced, by comparing the wing staffs in Figures 5-1 and 5-2, that it contained personnel from the air police, supply, personnel, installations, and communications units. (Wing staff specialists were normally added only when like functional elements were present in more than one group.) By this same reasoning, it is presumed that the support squadron was formed to accommodate those air police and food service personnel who remained in the air base group. There was, also, an organizational option for smaller bases.

Figure 5-3 depicts the organization that evolved through ADC testing.¹⁰ Essentially, the same basic structure as that in Figure 3-1 was maintained, except

Figure 5-2

COMBAT WING ORGANIZATION
DUAL GROUP BASES: 1955




Organization is for bases with more than one Combat Group.
All Combat Groups to be organized as the one depicted.

SOURCE: AFR 20-15, 19 August 1955.

Figure 5-3

BASE-OPERATING GROUP ORGANIZATION
(1955)



SOURCE: AFR 20-15, 19 August 1955.

that wing and group echelons of command were reduced to group and squadron levels, respectively. With the major changes inaugurated by this regulation--changes based upon MAJCOM test results and recommendations--one would imagine that the wing-base organization would remain stable for some time to come. This was not the case, however, as budget constraints imposed new problems.

Organizational Changes: 1956-1961

Shortages of manpower and money forced the Air Force to seek more efficient ways to accomplish assigned missions during this era. Tactical Air Command (TAC) formed an organizational committee in 1955 to study more efficient designs and Fifteenth Air Force (SAC) formed a 108-man team in 1956 to undertake a three week field observation of wing workflows, methods, and procedures.¹¹ This SAC project became known as "Fresh Approach." Then in 1957, an Air Force study group was formed by Mr. Lyle S. Garlock, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, to review missions, organization and operating restrictions, and financial controls.¹² This group requested all commands to identify unproductive workloads imposed upon field units. Over half of the 320 command submissions which recommended changes were acted upon, thus improving unit productivity.

There were efficiencies also achieved through organ-

izational realignments. Tactical group headquarters and maintenance and supply group headquarters were disestablished in many commands, thereby greatly reducing command and staff layering.¹³ As well, SAC and TAC consolidated many of their maintenance functions and adjusted the number of squadrons assigned to each wing.¹⁴ These actions resulted in appreciable savings in manpower and money, and were commended by Representative Davis, Chairman of the House Committee for Manpower Utilization.¹⁵

There were other changes, also, that related to the base commander. Although AFR 26-2 did not specify who was to be tasked with this responsibility, many commands gradually conferred the role upon the air base commander, or in commands where this group had been renamed, upon the combat support group commander.¹⁶ This transfer of responsibilities seemed to quickly follow the reorganizational alignments which required the wing commander to spend more time in supervising operations and maintenance functions.

These and other initiatives motivated TAC, SAC, and United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), to test new structures which would incorporate these changes plus yield additional efficiencies.

TAC Air Division Concept: 1957. TAC and its Ninth Air Force became deeply involved in planning and devel-


oping new organizational doctrine, policies, and guidance for TAC air divisions, wings, and squadrons during 1955 to 1957.¹⁷ TAC developed a new wing-base plan and, as recorded in the command history,

The first objective of the new plan was the achievement of an organization inherently possessing superior tactical versatility, mobility, and flexibility in combat, without compromising its ability to maintain a high state of operational readiness under peacetime training conditions. Other objectives were to allow tactical wing commanders to devote their primary attention to the achievement of combat effectiveness, and to organize the tactical units in such a manner that mobile independent Division, Wing and/or Squadron operation was an inherent capability.¹⁸

Although the initial organizational plan went through many revisions, the final wing-base structure approved by HQ USAF and implemented within TAC in 1957 is depicted in Figure 5-4.¹⁹ The concept provided for two tactical wings and an air base group reporting directly to an air division. Each wing possessed an organic maintenance capability; flight-line maintenance was organized within the tactical squadrons, and the remaining maintenance functions were assigned to the consolidated maintenance squadron. By this approach, both the combat group and the maintenance and supply group headquarters were eliminated with the squadrons reporting directly to the wing commander. All functions, other than tactical operations and maintenance, were assigned to the air base group,

Figure 5-4

TAC AIR DIVISION CONCEPT: 1957



* One wing designated as "parent organization" for support of tenant units.

** Troop Carrier Wings assigned (3) tactical sqs.

*** Not authorized for Troop Carrier Wings.

**** Designated to act as advisors to the Air Division Commander, or the Wing Commander on a single wing base.

SOURCE: History of TAC, 1 January-30 June 1957.

either as staff elements or within one of the four squadrons. Functional alignments within the squadrons were traditional, except that food service was integrated in the supply squadron.


During this same time frame, SAC was also seeking new organizational arrangements.

SAC Dual Deputy Concept: 1958. During 1956-1958, SAC conducted service tests: "Try Out," "Watch Tower," and "Fresh Approach" at Hunter, Little Rock, and Mountain Home AFB's, respectively.²⁰ The results of these service tests were formulated into a standard wing-base plan at a SAC reorganization conference convened in January 1958.²¹ The new structure, known as the "Deputy Commander Concept," incorporated deputy commanders for operations and maintenance to assist the wing commander in supervising these functional areas. This replaced the directorate and group commander concept which had been utilized within the command since 1951, and was implemented, with HQ USAF approval, in all SAC wings during 1958 and 1959.²² But, the new structure did more than just establish deputy commanders for operations and maintenance.

Figure 5-5 depicts SAC's dual deputy concept. Major changes from the HQ USAF standard wing-base plan of 1955 included:²³

Figure 5-5

SAC DUAL DEPUTY ORGANIZATION: 1958



- * Not authorized on a two wing base.
- ** Not authorized on a one wing base.

SOURCE: History 15th AF, Jan-Jun 1959, Chart 1.

1. Consolidation of all maintenance and operations functions under respective deputy commanders.
2. Establishment of wing directors for personnel, admin services, safety, comptroller, and supply.
3. Establishment of headquarters squadron and office of information services reporting to the wing commander.
4. Transfer of the staff judge advocate and chaplain from the wing to the combat support group staff.


As well, there were major changes made within the former air base group. Figure 5-6 depicts the reorganized air base group, renamed the combat support group.²⁴ Other than staff elements, all assigned functions were placed under four deputy commanders.

Throughout the wings, commanders and key personnel generally reacted favorably to the wing reorganization.²⁵ They felt that the new structure permitted them to exercise more direct control over assigned functions. The final SAC report on the restructuring concluded that:²⁶

...recapitulation clearly illustrates the increase in operational efficiency and alert capability gained under the new organization. In short, the new organization is sound and workable. No major problems exist either in concept or functional organization, only minor refinements in procedures and adjustments in manning are required

Keying on SAC's restructuring, USAFE implemented testing of its own version of the deputy commander con-

Figure 5-6



SAC DUAL DEPUTY ORGANIZATION: 1958


cept.

USAFE Tri-Deputy Concept: 1959. Figure 5-7 portrays the USAFE structure service tested at Wheelus and Spangdahlen Air Bases during 1959 and 1960.²⁷ Except for those personnel on the wing commander's staff, all functions were grouped under three deputy commanders for operations, maintenance, and services. Each deputy commander was authorized a headquarters squadron section which performed unit administration for personnel assigned to his area of responsibility. Operationally, the wing-base commander exercised command supervision over all activities through the deputy commander and his subordinate elements. He delegated duties to appropriate personnel, except those duties imposed upon the base commander under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and other acts or statutes.²⁸

CINCUSAFE and his staff believed that test data provided "abundant evidence of the tri-deputy organization's effectiveness," and requested HQ USAF approval in November 1960 to organize all USAFE wings by this pattern.²⁹ HQ USAF objected to the single-commander approach and hence denied the request: USAFE was directed to continue the test to acquire further test data. After a series of "point-counterpoint" exchanges, General Smith, USAF Vice Chief of Staff, wrote:³⁰

Figure 5-7

USAFE TRI-DEPUTY TEST: 1959



SOURCE: History of United States Air Forces In Europe, 1961.

Since 1948 the combat wing/base structure has steadily evolved toward...the placement of tactical and maintenance elements under direct control of the wing commander with base operating elements placed under the air base group/base commander....

Again, the USAFE plan was not approved for implementation. But on 9 August 1961, USAFE was authorized to adopt the structure described by General Smith.³¹

In Conclusion

During the latter part of the 1950's, manpower shortages created by budget cuts forced HQ USAF to seek more effective organizational forms. MAJCOM service testing of new concepts was authorized and in the case of SAC, approved for command adoption. Improvised structures which did not conform to evolving organizational doctrine were subjected to further testing and eventually disapproved. This was true of the USAFE proposal which conferred both wing and base commander responsibilities upon one individual. By 1961, it became evident that HQ USAF favored the dual deputy structure devised by SAC. This form would be modified somewhat and then be implemented Air Force-wide in 1962.

CHAPTER VI

USAF DUAL DEPUTY CONCEPT: 1962-1973

The proliferation of the differing organizational structures discussed in the previous chapter prompted HQ USAF to once again standardize the wing-base plan. The adopted dual deputy, support group concept was similar in many respects to the reorganizational plan approved for SAC in 1958. This new structure was implemented Air Force-wide in October 1962 by a HQ USAF letter¹ then formalized by publication of a new AFM 26-2, 11 December 1964.²

AFM 26-2 of 1964

AFM 26-2 prescribed standard organizational structures for varying types of units and functional elements, primarily those located at wing-base level.³ As well, this new manual consolidated into one central directive, those principles, policies, objectives, and procedures which were previously published in different regulations.* As a basis for tracking the evolving theory, the cogent portions of the contained principles, policies, and objectives will be discussed, followed by an analysis of the new organizational structures.

*AFM 26-2, 11 December 1964, superceeded AFRs 20-1, 15 April 1953, as amended; 20-15, 19 August 1955; and 20-27, 2 October 1959, as amended.

Principles. The four principles--unity of command, span of control, functional grouping, and delegation of authority--previously contained in AFR 20-1, were retained and expounded upon. In addition, a fifth principle, decision making, was added.⁴

Unity of command was identified as one of the "least understood principles of organization." Too frequently it had been mistakenly interpreted as being synonymous with the concept of "self-sufficiency" which implied that each commander should own all of the resources required to accomplish his mission. This erroneous viewpoint had led to the fragmentation of functional units, such as supply, by incorporating a portion of the function into each level of command. This was highly inefficient.

Instead, the intended meaning of "unity of command" was that the responsibilities of each individual should be clearly defined, that he be assigned clear responsibility for performing each task, and that he be held accountable to a single individual.⁵

Any mention of numbers limiting the personnel to be assigned to a single unit was deleted from the principle of span of control. The number of personnel a superior could effectively supervise depended upon such factors as:⁶

- Complexity of mission.
 - Dissimilarity of functional components of the organization.
 - Degree to which the nature of subordinate functions permitted satisfactory operation with minimum supervision.
 - Extent of coordination required by subordinates.
 - Distance separating subordinates from their superiors.
 - Type of management data and communications systems.
- It was acknowledged that the base commander could supervise the large number of people assigned to the combat support group because of the independence of operations inherent in many of his organizations.

The principle of functional grouping recognized that all functions having a common purpose or objective should be organized as an entity to enhance management, job assignments, and inter/intra unit coordination. This principle was used to support the assignment of maintenance and supply under a single deputy commander for materiel; both functional units embraced a "common objective of maintaining the weapon system in a state of operational readiness."⁷

Each commander was admonished to delegate authority to the fullest extent possible. If practiced, it was

felt that there would be little need for intermediate echelons of command and staff, particularly in view of the information made available to the commander through technological advances in communications and automatic data processing equipment.⁸

Further substantiation for minimizing the number of intermediate levels of organization lay within the fifth principle of decision making. Units should be structured to permit rapid decision making; unnecessary levels of supervision impeded the process.⁹

The explanation of these principles in this new manual disclosed greater theoretical sophistication and understanding than was true in previous directives. So was the case concerning the discussion of policies.

Policies. In abbreviated form, the guiding policies included:¹⁰

- Organizing to accomplish wartime tasks which embraced requirements for quick reaction, mobility, and operational flexibility.
- Organizing by functional approach, where possible.
- HQ USAF and MAJCOMs being committed toward organizational improvements and standardization.
- Authorization for MAJCOM testing of new organizational forms subject to 30 days prenotification of USAF, and securing HQ USAF approval prior to broad im-

plementation.

- Delegating authority to the lowest level. The air base group, or combat support group, commander was to be the base commander.

- Organizational forms within a functional area would follow standard Air Force patterns.*

- That "prestige" would not be a factor in determining the level and nomenclature for a particular unit or organization.

Objectives. Similarly, the objectives lend themselves to abbreviated iteration. They included:¹¹

- Optimizing mission accomplishment while minimizing expenditures of resources.

- Standardizing to enhance stability; to facilitate Air Force-wide management improvements; to facilitate developments of standards and performance comparisons; to lessen orientation time for personnel being transferred throughout the Air Force; to improve communications; and to keep pace with changing missions, technological advances, and new concepts of operations.

*This manual provided the first detailed organizational patterns for functional areas such as the central base personnel office (CBPO) etc.. In the 1950s, technological advancements in automatic data processing equipment allowed centralization of processes and elevation of control to MAJCOM and HQ USAF levels. This centralization of control demanded standardization of procedures and organization.

- Streamlining the decision making process. Tandem reviews by the chief and the deputy were to be avoided.


- Insuring organizational improvements were broadly applied.

These principles, policies and objectives provided a conceptual basis for understanding and applying the new wing-base organizational structures which applied to both single and multi-wing bases.

Wing-Base Organization. Figures 6-1 and 6-2 portray the standard organization for single-wing bases.¹² The greatest change from 1955 entailed aligning tactical functions under a deputy commander for operations (DCO), and assignment of all supply and maintenance elements under a deputy commander for materiel (DCM). Under the DCM arrangement there existed a chief of maintenance and a chief of supply. The removal of all maintenance functions from the tactical squadrons and consolidation of them under the DCM was tacitly concurred with by TAC.¹³ It was believed this singular grouping of maintenance might improve work quality as well as provide the tactical squadron commander more time to devote to his primary mission responsibilities. TAC's view concerning this matter was to change at a later date.

Concurrent with the establishment of deputy commanders, the wing commander's staff was largely disestablished

WING/GP ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE--SINGLE WING/GROUP BASE




* Includes base engine management function.

** Functional squadrons as required

SOURCE: AFM 26-2, 11 December 1964.

Figure 6-1

SUPPORT GP/SQ ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE--SINGLE WING/GP BASE



* Functional squadrons as appropriate (only when the support activity is a group.)

** Additional duty as wing chaplain.

SOURCE: AFM 26-2, 11 December 1964.

Figure 6-2

or transferred; only the offices of information and safety were retained. Transferred to the combat support group were the staff judge advocate, chaplain, and comptroller functions. In keeping with USAF guidance, neither the wing commander nor the base commander were authorized staffs, but rather were to rely upon subordinate functional chiefs and commanders for such assistance.¹⁴

One of the primary stated objectives of this reorganization was to free the wing commander of administrative details so he could maintain better mission orientation.¹⁵ In this regard, the wing executive was replaced with a wing vice commander. This was a modification to the wing-base plan as implemented in 1962. Then, only an executive officer was authorized and many commands insisted that this greatly restricted the wing commander's movement and involvement in primary mission activities.¹⁶ Now, with a vice commander, this restriction was removed. The "vice" could also assist the commander by mediating and solving problems that occurred at the deputy commander and group commander level.¹⁷

Changes to this pattern for multi-wing bases were minimal. In that situation, the supply function was assigned to the combat support group, leaving the remainder of the DCM organization unchanged. This was done to

preclude the establishment of two supply activities on one base.¹⁸ Also, the information office reported to the base commander when a host wing was not designated.¹⁹

This basic wing-base structure was destined to remain intact into the 1970's with only minor modifications. AFM 26-2 was republished in 1966²⁰ and again in 1970²¹ and provided for: establishment of an avionics maintenance squadron within the DCM and division status being conferred upon special services, education services, and data automation within the combat support group. As well, the office of history was added to those of safety and information which reported directly to the wing commander.

Although the wing-base organization was to enjoy over a decade of relative stability, this does not mean that there was total satisfaction with the structure. Problems would soon surface as Air Force involvement in South East Asia (SEA) increased.

TAC's Quest for Decentralized Maintenance

Historically, TAC had opposed the concept embodied in AFM 66-1 which dictated maintenance centralization and control under the wing commander.²² TAC viewed the concept as being viable for wings which predominately operated out of a home base, but not for those who were tasked with extended contingency deployments of squad-

rons, such as in TAC. This fact became readily apparent as the tempo of TAC squadron deployments to SEA increased in the mid 1960's. Squadrons, in the words of TAC's office of history

...were not configured the same for contingency operations as they were for peacetime, a fact which impaired their responsiveness and effectiveness during periods of deployment...it was fundamental that squadrons should not require extensive reorganization for employment in combat; rather the squadron should be configured and trained as an integrated, essentially self-sustaining combat unit. And yet experience had shown that these units required extensive reorganization when deployed.²³

During 1965 and 1966 General Disosway, the Commander of TAC, repeatedly offered proposals to HQ USAF for reorganizing tactical squadrons so as to incorporate a decentralized maintenance capability.²⁴ His proposals were denied, until he obtained support from Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) and USAFE Commanders in Chief (CINCs). HQ USAF then relented, somewhat, giving MAJCOMS the option to include periodic maintenance inspection in the squadron upon implementation of the "phased inspection" concept in each wing.²⁵

Additionally, HQ USAF authorized a joint USAFE and TAC test of TAC's decentralized maintenance concept.²⁶

---*TAC Histories of July-December 1965 and January-June 1966 contain extended classified discussions of organizational problems encountered by deploying squadrons.

The test in its final form went beyond the TAC concept, however, by transferring all periodic maintenance functions to the tactical squadrons. This occurred primarily because of the views of General Holloway, CINCUSAFE. He considered the squadron, not the wing, to be the basic fighting unit. At dispersed locations the tactical squadrons would be responsible for organizational level maintenance while a separate maintenance squadron would be deployed and assume responsibilities for field maintenance activities.²⁷

Emerging from the successful test was a joint TAC/USAFE proposal forwarded to HQ USAF in July 1966 for organizing along these lines.²⁸ The proposal was approved and, in November of that year, all TAC organizational maintenance squadrons were discontinued and their maintenance functions transferred to the tactical squadrons.²⁹ PACAF, however, continued to embrace AFM 66-1 and the centralized maintenance concept.³⁰ USAFE, also, subsequently withdrew its support for decentralized maintenance.³¹ These considerations, plus the evolution of technology for centralizing maintenance data collection and analysis, are seen as the primary reasons for HQ USAF to withdraw its approval in 1972, once again requiring TAC to return to AFM 66-1 and its centralized maintenance concept.³² The issue would lie dormant for

a time, but testing of a new decentralized maintenance concept would resume in 1974.³³

In Conclusion

The USAF reorganization of 1962 occurred for a number of reasons, some which were stated and others that were not.

The primary reason as declared by HQ USAF was to free the wing commander of many of his non-tactical responsibilities.³⁴ The establishment of deputy commanders for operations and materiel supported this objective, as did designation of the combat support group commander as the base commander. The replacement of the vice wing commander with an executive officer, however, worked at cross purposes with the goal of freeing the commander which, when recognized, resulted in HQ USAF reinstatement of a vice commander in 1964.

The unstated reasons for reorganizing lay within the realms of technology and standardization. During the 1950's, advancements in computers and associated equipment allowed greater centralization of control for functional areas.³⁵ Hence, it was imperative that organization and procedures be standardized at all levels, to the maximum extent possible. AFM 26-2 provided this detailed organizational guidance for all functional areas. Regarding standardization, the 1962 wing-base

plan replaced the variety of MAJCOM structures which had been approved and implemented in piece-meal fashion since 1955. It was not that standardization was an end in itself, but rather that it enhanced overall personnel management and management of the Air Force force structure.

This concern for management of resources was destined to become the root cause for yet another major reorganization which was to occur in the 1970's.

CHAPTER VII

ORGANIZATION DURING THE 1970's

The turn of the decade can be characterized as a period of growing concern for the management of resources and people. Anticipating an eventual withdrawal of forces from South East Asia and reductions in defense spending, General Momyer, the Commander of TAC, directed his staff to review all functions for essentiality.¹ From this analysis the TAC Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations concluded that wing commanders were spending too much time supporting flight operations rather than managing resources. His proposal was to establish a group commander for operations to assist the wing commander in managing the tactical mission. There is no evidence of follow-up or testing of this concept, most likely because of the abundant experience gained in the 1950's and 1960's when there existed a combat group commander as a standard organizational form.

USAFE shared TAC's concern but approached the problem differently. USAFE's concept was to intensify resource management by realigning support functions. This organizational form became known as the tri-deputy concept.

The Tri-Deputy Concept

Figure 7-1 depicts the tri-deputy concept conceived

USAFE TRI-DEPUTY ORGANIZATION




Figure 7-1

SOURCE: History of Seventeenth Air Force, FY 1974, Vol. I.

by General David C. Jones, CINCUSAFE, which was first implemented for testing at the 50th Tactical Fighter Wing, Hahn Air Base, Germany in 1972.² Being convinced that the chief of maintenance required more frequent and direct dialogue with the wing commander, General Jones elevated the chief of maintenance to deputy commander status and redesignated the deputy commander for logistics as the deputy commander for resource management (DCR).³ Then, beneath the DCR were assigned logistics plans, supply, comptroller, procurement, and transportation.

It was believed that the wing-base structure "had become less and less responsive to the swelling and shifting demands placed on it."⁴ While frequent reorganization to accommodate change was impractical, the tri-deputy concept was viewed as a form that would accommodate future as well as existing priorities. As stated in USAFE's history,

Changing priorities had stabilized to include four vital and continuing needs required of the tactical wings. The first was the primary mission: to fly and train effectively and safely. Second, was a continuing emphasis on quality maintenance. As weapons systems grow older and new weapon systems become more complex, this emphasis must increase. Closely allied to maintenance effectiveness was the ever-intensifying budgetary pressure for improved management of resources, especially dollars. Finally, the wing was squarely in the people-related business, a trend which was welcomed but which had not been recognized organizationally.⁵

Results of the two year test were favorable and the tri-deputy organization was implemented throughout USAFE in 1974.⁶ General Jones notified other major commands of the positive test results but responses to the new structure were mixed.

Of all the MAJCOMS receiving USAFE test results, only TAC and MAC tested the concept. TAC was not pleased with results and the TAC commander recommended that the concept be dropped.⁷ The MAC experience was just the opposite; the test was so successful that MAC implemented the tri-deputy organization throughout the command in December 1974.⁸ Other commands were more or less unresponsive to the proposal.

The fractionalized MAJCOM viewpoints toward the tri-deputy concept posed a dilemma for HQ USAF. In response to a query from General Jones, General Richard H. Ellis, USAF Vice Chief of Staff, wrote,

If you have come up with a better organization, we should apply it wherever feasible. By the same token, the Air Force should not be using several different wing/base organizations unless there are good reasons for doing so.⁹

After General Jones became the USAF Chief of Staff in 1974 he wrote General Dixon, the TAC commander:

As CINCPACAF, Lou recently asked for approval to implement the tri-deputy organization in the Pacific this September and the request has been approved.

We are aware of the TAC test of the USAFE

concept at Cannon last year and that you did not recommend its adoption at that time; however, in the interest of minimizing confusion during overseas tactical deployments, we should press for standardization in the organization of all our tactical wings.¹⁰

On 18 January 1975, the Air Staff announced that USAFE, TAC, MAC and PACAF had all implemented the tri-deputy wing-base structure and that it would become the standard organization throughout the Air Force on 1 July 1975.¹¹ The standardized form was the same as that tested in USAFE with an option for retaining logistics plans within DCM. For MAC tenant wings it was approved, also, for the DCR to be retained as a division on the staff of the tenant wing commander.¹² As well, other minor modifications have since been approved to meet the needs of individual commands; still, the tri-deputy concept remains essentially intact.*

Although the implementation of the tri-deputy concept throughout the Air Force was the major realignment of the wing-base structure in the 1970's, there have been other significant changes within sub-element functional areas.

Other Changes

During this period, organizational realignments were

*PACAF has modified the tri-deputy organization at two of its bases: at Kadena a deputy commander of civil engineering was added because of off-base area responsibilities; at Osan, a deputy commander for tactical control was established as a primary mission element.¹³

effected within the areas of special services, social actions, and maintenance. The first two changes emanated from concerns for people and the latter in pursuit of greater tactical mobility.

Creation of MWR. The Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) division was created Air Force wide in 1975, following the 1974 testing of the new concept of operations at Dyess, Bergstrom, Travis, and Ramstein Air Base.¹⁴ The primary thrust was to consolidate financial operations from the clubs, finance, and other recreational activities whereby greater centralized control over MWR assets could be realized. This was in response to the increase in theft and embezzlement encountered during the Vietnam era.¹⁵ Negative social values also promulgated expansion and realignments within the area of social actions.

Social Actions. During the late 1960's and early 1970's, surfacing social ills of drug abuse and discrimination resulted in increased emphasis on base social action programs. As acknowledged by the HQ USAF Military Personnel Center, direction and emphasis from the executive, congressional, and Office of the Secretary of Defense motivated the implementation of "several new programs without specific guidance given on organizational/functional responsibility."¹⁶ The programs referred to

were: drug abuse, education in race relations, equal opportunity and treatment of military personnel, domestic actions, dissident protests, and equal employment opportunity. They were loosely organized under the auspices of the "installation commander," "base commander," or "local commander."¹⁷ In 1976, however, those programs which were consolidated under the office of social actions were placed under the immediate supervision of the "senior installation commander." Although "installation commander" is not a defined Air Force term,¹⁹ this has generally been interpreted as being the wing commander.^{20*} This being the case, a conflict is seen to exist in view of accepted organizational principles, policies, and objectives. As a "people program," social actions should be assigned under the base commander.


POMO. The remaining organizational change to be documented is the implementation of production oriented maintenance organization (POMO). This concept had its origins in the 1960's when TAC was particularly concerned with attaining a decentralized maintenance capability in order to enhance mobility. As discussed in Chapter VI,

*AFM 11-1 does separately define "installation" and "commander." The separate definitions, when combined, do not lead to a reasoned conclusion that the installation commander is the wing commander. Confusion is interjected also, because the term "installation commander" has been used interchangeably over time with the term base commander.

HQ USAF, at that time, directed that TAC return to the centralized maintenance concept embodied in AFM 66-1. Subsequently, HQ USAF inaugurated a maintenance posture improvement program (MPIP) whereby TAC was directed in 1974 to critically analyze new maintenance organizational structures which might improve operational effectiveness and mobility posture.²¹ TAC implemented testing of "production oriented maintenance concept" (POMC) at MacDill AFB in the summer of 1975. The test embodied one maintenance squadron performing "on-aircraft maintenance" and another squadron performing "off-aircraft maintenance." The basic POMC theory was to broaden the "generalist" skills of specialists which was expected to increase productivity.²² The test was successfully concluded and the POMC concept implemented Air Force-wide by AFR 66-5, published 17 October 1977.²³

Figure 7-2 portrays the basic maintenance organization under POMC.²⁴ As can be seen, a decentralized maintenance capability has not been incorporated within the tactical squadrons. There is, however, policy-direction that the aircraft generation squadron organize its flightline activity into aircraft maintenance units (AMUs) in number equal to the number of fighter squadrons assigned to the wing.²⁵ The stated objective of the AMU organization, as stipulated in the regulation,

Figure 7-2
PRODUCTION ORIENTED MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION (POMO)



* May include Munitions Control.

SOURCE: AFR 66-5, 17 October 1977.

...is to foster rapport between aircrew members and maintenance people, and to encourage more maintenance identification with the flying mission. Command authority and management responsibility for the AMUs rests solely with the Aircraft Generation Squadron commander.²⁶

Hence, retention of functional integrity has been favored in contrast to assigning a portion of the maintenance activity to the operations area. Upon the deployment of a tactical squadron, a separate AMU will be deployed for maintenance support. Only experience will disclose whether this organizational structure adequately satisfies the dual requirements of operational mobility and maintenance productivity.

Proposals Not Adopted

In addition to those organizational forms that were tested, there were two concepts that were officially studied but never tested nor adopted. The first concerned a joint SAC/TAC test of consolidation of B-52 and F-4 maintenance activities at Seymour Johnson AFB in 1975.²⁷ After one year's experience the concept was abandoned.²⁸ The second proposal studied but never acted upon set forth a recommendation for aligning the base commander and his indirect support functions under a newly created "Base Support Command."²⁹ The study did identify certain risks inherent in the reorganization; combining indirect support manpower into one organization would likely invite intervention by Congress,

Defense, and the Office of Management and Budget, as the command could pose a lucrative target for future manpower cuts. Hence, the proposal was never acted upon.

In Conclusion

The primary thrust of the organizational changes adopted in the 1970's has been to improve the management of wing resources while accommodating mobility requirements and concern for the quality of life for the Air Force community. How effective these changes have been is an area of concern that can best be ascertained by measuring the perceptions of key personnel assigned at the wing-base level. This measurement and analysis is the subject for discussion in Chapter VIII.

CHAPTER VIII

CONSIDERATIONS FOR CHANGE

Two approaches were taken to measure existing organizational attitudes; letters to MAJCOM Chiefs of Staff were mailed and surveys were administered to key personnel at bases organized under the Tri-Deputy concept. These findings are discussed, potential problems summarized, and recommendations set-forth for further actions.

MAJCOM Perceptions

The letter sent to SAC, MAC, PACAF, USAFE, and TAC Chiefs of Staff read:

As a command, are you satisfied with the current wing organization. If not, what would you change and why. Any form of statistical, attitudinal, or positional information regarding change would be helpful. All inputs will be treated as non-attribution unless you specify otherwise.¹

Four of the five commands replied. Although some historical references were provided to assist in my research, there were no replies which indicated any dissatisfaction with the existing Tri-Deputy structure. Response from the fifth MAJCOM was in the form of a telephone call from the command manpower chief; the individual indicated that the command's recommendation, previously submitted to the USAF Chief of Staff and proposing that the wing commander also be designated the base commander, remained

as the official position.

Base Perceptions

The second method utilized to measure organizational attitudes embodied a USAF approved survey which was mailed to 310 key personnel at 31 bases within the same five MAJCOMs. One hundred and ninety four surveys were returned for a 63% response rate. This rate was considered excellent in view of the administrative delays encountered which allowed only four weeks from mailing to return of the surveys; the Christmas holidays also fell in the middle of this survey period.

A copy of the survey which was administered is contained in Appendix A. In an attempt not to introduce bias, no hypothesis as to the existing structure being good or bad was set forth. Relying upon individual values, participants were asked to respond to the questions utilizing a satisfaction scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest. Responses were measured by job title and by command of assignment as a means of pinpointing any significant differences of perceptions which might exist. In the interests of brevity and as a basis for highlighting potential problem areas, only responses marked 1 or 2 are evaluated in this text for each of the questions asked. A complete statistical analysis is contained within

Appendix B.

Q-2: Fulfillment of Organizational Goals. In collective form, the vast majority of the respondents felt that the Tri-Deputy structure had fulfilled, enhanced, or greatly enhanced each of the organizational goals. There were, however, respondents who felt that the 1975 organization had resulted in degradation as portrayed in Table 8-1. (% depicted represent small sample size. See p. 120.)

Table 8-1
% of Respondents Who Marked 2-Degraded

	SAC	MAC	PACAF	USAFE	TAC	TOTAL
<u>Aircraft Maint.</u>						
DM				25%		3.7%
<u>People Programs</u>						
CSG/CD	16.7%			33.3%		11.1%
<u>Mgmt. of Resources</u>						
Wg/CC	16.7%					5.0%
DCO			100.0%			4.2%
DCM				25.0%		4.2%
ADCM	14.3%				33.3%	14.3%
CSG/CC				33.3%		7.7%
CSG/CD	16.7%			66.7%		15.8%

SOURCE: Dec 77 Survey (Question no. 2)

As can be seen, existing dissatisfaction primarily concerns the goal of resource management, and that lies

Within USAFE and SAC.

Q-3: Fulfillment of Organizational Principles. Table 8-2 depicts the negative responses to this question.

Table 8-2						
%of Respondents Who Marked 2-Degraded						
	SAC	MAC	PACAF	USAFE	TAC	TOTAL
<u>Unity of Command</u>						
Wg/cc			50.0%			4.9%
DCO	9.9%	100.0%		25.0%		3.0%
ADCO	22.2%					10.0%
DCM				25.0%		4.1%
ADCM	14.3%				a	7.1%
CSG/CC	40.0%					14.3%
CSG/CD	20.0%			100.0%		21.5%
<u>Span of Control</u>						
Wg/CC	16.7%		50.0%			9.9%
Wg/CV					20.0%	5.0%
ADCO	22.2%					10.0%
DCM				50.0%		8.3%
ADCM	14.3%					7.1%
CSG/CC				33.3%		6.7%
CSG/CD			50.0%	33.3%		9.9%
<u>Functional Grouping</u>						
Wg/CC	16.7%	50.0%	50.0%	25.0%		19.0%
DCO		100.0%		50.0%		13.5%
ADCO	11.1%					5.0%
DCM	22.2%			25.5%		12.5%
ADCM	28.6%					14.3%
CSG/CC	40.0%			33.3%		21.4%
CSG/CD			50.0%	33.3%		9.9%
(Cont. next p.)						

Table 8-2 (Cont.) % of Respondents Who Marked 2-Degraded						
	SAC	MAC	PACAF	USAFE	TAC	TOTAL
<u>Delegation of Authority</u>						
Wg/CV			25.0%			5.0%
DCO				25.0%		4.9%
DCM	11.1%					4.1%
ADCM	28.6%					14.3%
CSG/CC	40.0%			33.3%		21.4%
CSG/CD	20.0%			100.0%		21.5%
<u>Decision Making</u>						
Wg/CC	16.7%					4.9%
DCM	11.1%			25.0%		8.3%
ADCM	28.6%					14.3%
CSG/CC	60.0%	100.0%				21.4%
CSG/CD	20.0%	66.7%	50.0%	100.0%		36.8%
<u>SOURCE: Dec 77 Survey</u>						

As is apparent, broader dissatisfaction persists with the Tri-Deputy structure in fulfilling organizational principles than with the goals. It is perhaps understandable that none of the DCRs or ADCRs felt that the establishment of the resource management function violated organizational principles. A much different opinion, however, was expressed by those assigned within maintenance and support functions. Functional grouping and decision making are the two areas of greatest concern.

Q-4: Satisfaction With the Tri-Deputy Structure.

Table 8-3 depicts those respondents who expressed a degree of dissatisfaction with the current organizational structure.

Table 8-3						
% of Respondents Who Indicated Dissatisfaction With Tri-Deputy Structure						
	SAC	MAC	PACAF	USAFE	TAC	TOTAL
Wg/CC	50.0*		50.0		14.3	23.9
Wg/CV				50.0		5.0
DCO		100.0				4.5
ADCO	11.1		50.0			10.0
DCM	22.2			25.0		12.5
ADCM	14.3					7.1
DCR						0.0
ADCR						0.0
CSG/CC	60.0			33.3		28.6
CSG/CD	20.0*	33.3	50.0	100.0		31.6

* Includes those who marked 1-totally dissatisfied. See Appendix B.

SOURCE: Dec 77 Survey

The pattern of responses in Table 8-3 tend to conform with those commands and individual positions which also rated goals and principles low.

Q-5: Workload and Career Progression. This question was asked in order to form subjective judgements of job structuring should organizational change be deemed desirable. Table 8-4 depicts the workload of each key position as viewed by the wing commanders. Table 8-5 portrays wing commander and composite mean of how each key job is perceived in terms of career progression.

Table 8-4			
Wing Commander Rating of Job Workload			
Wg/CC	4.75	CSG/CC	4.40
DCM	4.75	DCO	4.31
Wg/CV	4.69	DCR	3.67
SOURCE: Dec 77 Survey			

Table 8-5			
Mean Rating of Career Perceptions As Viewed By			
Wing Commander		Composite	
Wg/CC	4.74	Wg/CC	4.72
DCO	4.47	DCO	4.34
Wg/CV	4.25	Wg/CV	4.30
DCM	3.63	DCM	3.64
CSG/CC	3.26	CSG/CC	3.52
DCR	3.10	DCR	3.13
SOURCE: Dec 77 Survey			

In comparing the workload and career progression perceptions, one can readily see a strong correlation exists between the two.

Q-6: Recommended Organizational Changes. This question was structured so as to allow the respondent free expression of recommended changes. Of the 190 respondents, 72.1% recommended no change at all, or changes which would not alter the basic Tri-Deputy structure. Table 8-6 contains a listing of those changes recommended most often.

Table 8-6
Summary of Changes Recommended most Frequently

<u>No. Replies</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Recommended Change</u>
16	8.4	Redesignate CSG/CC as Dep Comdr
16	8.4	Eliminate DCR
	4.7	Place Supply under DCM
8	4.2	Eliminate or reduce Hqs Sqs
7	3.7	Assign Base Ops under DCO
5	2.6	Assign Personnel under DCR
5	2.6	Assign Civil Engineering under DCR

SOURCE: Dec 77 Survey

Focusing on the two major changes recommended most often, responses were analyzed by MAJCOM and by job position. As portrayed in Table 8-7, it is readily apparent that the strongest sentiment to redefine the role and position of the base commander lies within SAC. This sentiment is felt most strongly by wing and vice wing commanders.

Table 8-7
% of Respondents Recommending CSG/CC to DC

	SAC	MAC	PACAF	USAFE	TAC	TOTAL
Wg/CC	50.0					15.0
Wg/CV	50.0					18.2
DCO	20.0			25.0		13.6
ADCO						0.0
DCM	22.2					8.3
ADCM				100.0		3.1
DCR	20.0				20.0	10.5
ADCR	16.7					6.3

Cont. next page

Table 8-7
(Cont.)

CSG/CC						0.0
CSG/CD						0.0
Total	17.8	0.0	0.0	9.1	2.4	8.4
Wg/CC/CV						
DCO, DCM						
DCR	34.2	0.0	0.0	5.3	4.2	15.0
DCO, DCM,						
DCR	20.8	0.0	0.0	16.7	8.3	10.8

SOURCE: Dec 77 Survey

The percentage of respondents who recommended elimination of the DCR organization is contained in Table 8-8.

Table 8-8
% of Respondents Recommending
Elimination of DCR

	SAC	MAC	PACAF	USAFE	TAC	TOTAL
Wg/CC	16.7	0.0				5.0
Wg/CV						0.0
DCO	10.0	100.0				9.9
ADCO	11.1					5.0
DCM						0.0
ADCM	11.1					7.1
DCR		100.0				5.3
ADCR						0.0
CSG/CC	40.0		50.0	66.7		38.5
CSG/CD	25.0		50.0	25.0		25.0
TOTAL	11.0	13.3	7.4	9.1	0.0	8.4

SOURCE: Dec 77 Survey

Again, it is SAC that strongly supports a change, although sentiment for eliminating the resource manage-

ment function is pervasive in the support groups throughout SAC, PACAF, and USAFE.

Table 8-9 portrays the % of DCR and CSG/CC replies which recommended realignment of functions between their two organizations.

Table 8-9						
% of Respondents Recommending Reassignment of DCR and CSG Functions						
	SAC	MAC	PACAF	USAFE	TAC	TOTAL
<u>DCR Replies</u>						
Pers to DCR	25.0		25.0	25.0	20.0	23.5
DE to DCR	25.0				20.0	11.8
Comp to CSG	25.0					5.9
						41.2
<u>CSG/CC Replies</u>						
DE to DCR	20.0					7.7
SOURCE: Dec 77 Survey						

In Summary

Although survey results did not indicate the existence of widespread discontent with the Tri-Deputy concept, pockets of dissatisfaction were evident. These, in summary form, included:

- 12% of all respondents in question 2 indicated some dissatisfaction with the wing-base structure.
- 28% of all respondents to question 6 recommended major changes. The difference between the 12% and 28% is mostly attributable to the DCRs. All expressed satisfaction in question 2, but 35.3% recommended either the transfer of personnel or civil engineering from CSG/CC to DCR.

- 48.9% of all DCRs and CSG/CCs recommended realignment of major functions between the two organizations. The basis for these changes was to assign under one commander those units which required close coordination in their daily activities. These embodied mostly procurement, civil engineering, and the comptroller.
- 19% of Wg/CC, 12.5 % of DCM, 14.3% of DCR, and 21.5% of CSG/CC replies expressed that the Tri-Deputy structure degraded functional grouping.
- 29% of all CSG/CC and CSG/CD replies indicated that their decision making had been degraded.
- 50% of all SAC Wg/CC and Wg/CV replies expressed that the Wg/CC should also be the Base/CC and that the CSG/CC should be redesignated Deputy Commander for Support.
- 17% of Wg/CC and 40% of CSG/CC replies in SAC recommended elimination of the DCR function. These replies were voluntary.
- 39% of all CSG/CCs voluntarily recommended elimination of DCR.
- 55% of all Wg/CC and CSG/CC replies in SAC expressed slight or great dissatisfaction with the current organization.
- Other comments made which are considered significant include:
 - +Change is confusing and lowers efficiency.
 - +Place base ops/comm/wx under DCO.
 - +Reduce or eliminate large CCQ squadrons.
 - +Give deputy commanders more control over their people.
 - +Form procurement/comptroller squadrons within DCR.

Conclusions

An organizational structure which would incorporate most of the survey recommendations and rectify existing dissatisfactions would be a wing/base commander over three group commanders--operations, maintenance and supply,

and support. The tri-group commander concept did exist in the 1950's and from all indications it worked very well. The primary reason that group commanders were eliminated during that period was to save manpower. For a group commander to function during that era, conventional wisdom and decentralized administration demanded that the group commander maintain a large staff. Hence, when the staffs were cut to save manpower spaces, group commanders were eliminated, except for combat support. Since, however, centralization and automation of personnel and finance functions permits a group commander to fulfill his leadership responsibilities without maintaining such a staff. Evidence of this is the fact that the combat support group commander functions with only a deputy and a secretary.

The group commander concept would reintroduce commander leadership responsibilities within the ranks of current O-6 deputy commanders. Each group commander could organize a Hq Sq (CCQ Sq) for his functional staff with the squadron being commanded by his deputy group commander on an additional-duty basis. Administrative personnel for these CCQ squadrons could be from existing resources and from positions freed through the disbandment of DCR and wing/base CCQ squadrons. Along this line, additional squadrons should be formed for such activities

as MWR, personnel, finance, etc. The group CCQ squadron arrangement should enhance unit identification and improve the leadership over functional staff personnel. This is particularly true in view of the fact that many of the functional staff personnel assigned to existing CCQ squadrons are senior to the CCQ squadron commander.

To enable the wing commander to fulfill his base commander responsibilities, the wing staff should consist of those units most directly involved in "people programs," to include: information, personnel, legal, social actions, and chaplain. The base commander could, with authoritative provision, delegate courts martial jurisdiction to his group commanders and continue to act as a review authority. Or if retention of courts martial jurisdiction is desired, the wing vice commander could chair a discharge review board which would considerably reduce the in-depth review workload imposed upon the base commander. Similar discharge review boards now exist at the combat support group level and are chaired by the deputy base commander.

But for this or similar restructuring to take place, definite questions should first be answered.

-- Does sentiment and logic support restructuring?
Obviously the Dec 77 survey results should be verified or denied before change is considered.

-- How involved must the wing commander be in tactical

operations? Has history, perhaps, unduly influenced the definition of his job while circumstances have changed? No longer is the wing commander required to be airborne to command multi-squadron formations, as was the case in World War II. Conversely, his planning and management responsibilities have increased immensely in light of existing limited, costly resources--including people.

- Does DCR improve management of resources or just make it more difficult for people to accomplish their jobs?
- How can we best improve the morale and productivity of our people--"our most important asset"?

Obviously, there are many more questions which could and should be asked. But if we are to arrive at objective answers, the ever present "blocks" of habit, fear, prejudice, and inertia will have to be overcome. Good people can make any organization work but a better organization can make good people work better.

Recommendations

In view of the sentiment for change expressed by respondents to this limited survey, it is recommended:

- That a more in-depth evaluation of the effectiveness of the current organization be investigated, perhaps through LMDC management consultation.
- That wing-base organization be added as an agenda item for the next USAF commanders' conference.

NOTES ON CHAPTER I

1. Robert Heinlein, "Thoughts...on the Business of Life," Forbes, September 17, 1977, p. 284.

2. "SAC's Proposal to Retitle the Base Commander to Deputy Commander for Support," Letter of Director, Senior Officer Education, Leadership and Management Development Center (AU), to HQ USAF Chief of Staff Executive Officer, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 14 November 1977.

3. History of Tactical Air Command, 1 January-31 December 1965, Volume I, P. 52. SECRET

NOTES ON CHAPTER II

1. Companies: General Provisions, Army Regulation 245-5, War Department, 20 July 1925, pp. 1-2.
2. Ibid., p. 3.
3. History of the United States Air Force, ATC Pam 190-1, Headquarters Air Training Command, 1 June 1961, pp. 3-10 to 3-12.
4. Lieutenant Colonel John M. McNabb, "An Analysis of the New Wing Base Organization," Air Command and Staff School, Professional Study, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, October 1948, p. 1. Hereafter cited as McNabb.
5. Ibid., p. 2.
6. "General Headquarters Air Force," Letter of Adjutant General, War Department to All Commanding Generals, Special Units, etc., Washington, D. C., 31 December 1934, pp. 1-3.
7. Ibid., pp. 1-2.
8. Ibid., p. 3.
9. "General Headquarters Air Force: Correspondence File 320.3: Organization GHQ AF 1934-1938," The Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
10. Development of Administrative Planning and Control in the AAF, Army Air Forces Historical Studies No. 28, p. 66.
11. The Question of Autonomy For The United States Air Arm: 1907-1945, Part II, Air University Documentary Research Study, Air University Library, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1950, p. 178.
12. "General Headquarters Air Force: Correspondence File 320.3: Organization GHQ AF 1934-1938."
13. Ibid., Memo, 20 October 1936.
14. "Organization of the GHQ Air Force," Letter of Commanding General, GHQ Air Force to Commanding General, 2nd Wing, GHQ Air Force, Langley Field, Virginia, 26 April 1937.

15. "General Headquarters Air Force" Letter of Adjutant General, War Department to Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, Washington, D. C., 8 December 1937, p. 1.

16. Ibid., p. 1.

17. The Question of Autonomy For The United States Air Arm: 1907-1945, Par II, p. 178.

18. History of the United States Air Force, p. 8-2.

19. McNabb, pp. 2-3.

20. Ibid., p. 3.

21. Ibid., p. 3.

22. Lieutenant Colonel Ward W. Martindale, "An Analysis of The New Wing-Base Organization," Air Command and Staff School, Professional Study, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, October 1948, p. 4.

23. Personal interview with Major General James B. Tipton, USAF (Ret), 26 September 1977.

24. McNabb, p. 3.

NOTES ON CHAPTER III

1. Major W. F. Golden, "Report of Visit to Shaw Field with AAF Manning Survey Board and TAC O&M Team, 13 May 47," Exhibit 15, pp. 1-7, in History of Tactical Air Command for 1947, Volume I. Hereafter cited as Golden, and basic document as TAC History for 1947.

2. Ibid., p. 2.

3. History of Strategic Air Command, 1947, Volume I, p. 21. Hereafter cited as SAC History for 1947.

4. Golden, p. 4.

5. TAC History for 1947, p. 9.

6. Ibid., p. 10.

7. Organization: Reorganization of AAF Base Units and Installations, AAFR 20-15, Headquarters Army Air Forces, 27 June 1947. Hereafter cited as AAFR 20-15.

8. AAFR 20-15.

9. Ibid..

10. Ibid..

11. Lieutenant Colonel R. A. Erdin, "A Study of the Wing-Base Organization," Air Command and Staff School, Professional Study, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1949, p. 16.

12. Ibid., p. 16.

13. Colonel Sam W. Cheyney, "Supervisory Inspection, 1st Fighter Wing, 23 Oct 47," Exhibit 36, p. 1, in TAC History for 1947.

14. Colonel Julius A. Kolb, "MEMORANDUM to the Wing Historical Officer, 62d Troop Carrier Wing, McChord Field, Washington, 15 January 1948," Exhibit 37, p. 3, in TAC History for 1947.

15. SAC History for 1947, p. 24.

16. TAC History for 1947, p. 13.

17. Major General W. D. Old, "Reorganization of Air

Force Wings, 7 May 1948," Exhibit 39-5, p. 1, in TAC History for 1947.

18. TAC History for 1947, p. 18.

19. Brigadier General Robert M. Lee, "Recommendations on Wing-Base Plan of Organization as Prescribed by AF Regulation 20-15, 12 Dec 47," Exhibit 39-4, p. 1, in TAC History for 1947.

20. Lieutenant General E. R. Quesada, Letter to Major General Glenn O. Barcus, 6 October 1948, Exhibit 38, pp. 6-8, in TAC History for 1947.

21. Ibid., p. 3.

22. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

23. Ibid., p. 6.

24. TAC History for 1947, p. 9.

25. SAC History for 1947, p. 13.

NOTES ON CHAPTER IV

1. Organization of Air Force Combat Wings, AFR 20-15, Department of the Air Force, 13 December 1948, p.12, and ammendments of 9 June 1949 and 11 June 1952. Hereafter cited as AFR 20-15.

2. Ibid., pp. 1-15.

3. Ibid., p. 2.

4. Ibid., pp. 1-12.

5. Ibid., p. 13.

6. Ibid., p. 1.

7. Lieutenant General E. R. Quesada, Letter to Major General Glenn O. Barcus, 6 October 1948, Exhibit 38, pp. 6-8, in History of Tactical Air Command, 1947. Hereafter cited as Quesada.

8. Major General F. H. Smith, USAF/AFOOR Letter, "SAC Regulation 66-12, Dated 30 August 1949," to Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, 23 November 1949, in History of Strategic Air Command, 1949, Volume II, Supporting Documents.

9. Ibid., pp. 4-7.

10. Ibid., p. 6.

11. Ibid., p. 7.

12. Standardization and Stabilization of Air Force Organization, AFR 20-53, Department of the Air Force, 21 October 1949, p. 1.

13. Ibid., p. 1.

14. Headquarters Air Defense Command Semi-Annual Historical Report Number 2, 1951.

15. Ibid., pp. 99-101.

16. Ibid., p. 102.

17. Ibid., p. 99.

18. Ibid., pp. 91-92.
19. Air Defense Command Historical Study No. 9: Organization and Responsibility for Air Defense, March '46-September '55.
20. Ibid., p. 69.
21. History of Eighth Air Force, 1 January-30 June 1951, pp. 22-28.
22. Ibid..
23. Organization Principles and Policies for the USAF, AFR 20-1, Department of the Air Force, 15 April 1953, pp. 1-4, and ammendment AFR 20-1A, 28 April 1953. Hereafter cited as AFR 20-1.
24. Quesada, pp. 6-8.
25. AFR 20-1, p. 1.
26. Captain James R. Ognen, USN, "An Evaluation of Air Force Organizational Philosophy," Air War College, Professional Paper, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 22 April 1953, p. 12.
27. History of Air Ground Operations School, April-June 1952, p. 2.
28. Ibid..
29. Major Carvil A. Trudeau, Wing Reorganization, Air Command and Staff School, Professional Study, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 20 May 1954, p. 6.
30. Ibid., p. 7.

NOTES ON CHAPTER V

1. History: Directorate of Manpower and Organization, DCS/O, Headquarters USAF, 1 January 1955-30 June 1955, p. 75. SECRET

2. Ibid., p. 76.

3. Organization of Air Force Operating Units, AFR 20-15, Department of the Air Force, 19 August 1955, p. 1. Hereafter cited as AFR 20-15, 1955.

4. Ibid..

5. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

6. Ibid., p. 8.

7. Major General W. D. Old, "Reorganization of Air Force Wings, 7 May 1949," Exhibit 39-5, p. 1, in History of Tactical Air Command for 1949.

8. AFR 20-15, 1955, p. 3.

9. Ibid., p. 9.

10. Ibid., p. 10.

11. History of Fifteenth Air Force, July-December 1956, Volume 1, pp. 20-22. SECRET

12. History: Directorate of Manpower and Organization, DCS/O-Headquarters USAF, 1 July 1957-31 December 1957, pp. 45-52. SECRET

13. Ibid..

14. Ibid..

15. Ibid..

16. Ibid.. See also History of the Fifth Air Force, 1 January-30 June 1957, Volume 1, pp. 36-49. SECRET

17. History of Tactical Air Command, 1 January 1957-30 June 1957, Volume 1, p. 55. SECRET

18. Ibid., p. 56.

19. Ibid., pp. 60-62.
20. History of Strategic Air Command, June 1958-July 1959, Historical Study No. 76, Volume I, p. 65. SECRET
21. Ibid..
22. Ibid., p. 66.
23. History of the Fifteenth Air Force, January-June 1959, Volume I, Chart No. 1. Hereafter cited as History 15 AF, Jan-Jun 59. SECRET See also, AFR 20-15, 1955, pp. 9-10.
24. History of 15 AF, Jan-Jun 59, Chart No. 2.
25. Ibid., p. 26.
26. Ibid..
27. History of Headquarters Seventeenth Air Force, 1 January-30 June 1960, Volume I, pp. 141-142. SECRET See also, History of United States Air Forces in Europe, 1 January-30 June 1961, Volume I, pp. 59-61. Hereafter cited as History of USAFE Jan-Jun 61. SECRET
28. History of USAFE Jan-Jun 61, pp. 60-61.
29. Ibid., p. 61.
30. Ibid..
31. Ibid..

NOTES ON CHAPTER VI

1. "Standard Wing/Base Organization," Letter from Commander, Air Defense Command (ADC), to all ADC Air Divisions, Colorado Springs, 14 December 1962, Document No. 5 in Documents 1-29, 28th Air Division (SAGE) History, January-December 1962, Volume I. SECRET

2. Organization Policy and Guidance, AFM 26-2, Department of the Air Force, 11 December 1964, p. i. Hereafter cited as AFM 26-2 of 1964.

3. Ibid..

4. Ibid., pp. 1-4.

5. Ibid., p. 1.

6. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

7. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

8. Ibid., p. 3.

9. Ibid., p. 4.

10. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

11. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

12. Ibid., pp. 26-27.

13. History of Tactical Air Command, July-December 1962, Volume I, p. 52. SECRET

14. AFM 26-2 of 1964, p. 6.

15. History of 28th Air Division (SAGE), January-December 1962, Volume I, p. 5. SECRET

16. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

17. AFM 26-2 of 1964, p. 25.

18. Ibid., p. 29.

19. Ibid..

20. Organization Policy and Guidance, AFM 26-2,

Department of the Air Force, 15 March 1966.

21. Organization Policy and Guidance, AFM 26-2, Department of the Air Force, 7 May 1970.

22. History of Tactical Air Command, 1 January-30 June 1966, Volume I, p. 52. Hereafter cited as TAC History, Jan-Jun 1966. SECRET

23. History of Tactical Air Command, 1 January-31 December 1965, Volume I, p. 76. SECRET

24. TAC History, Jan-Jun 1966, pp. 52-83.

25. Ibid., p. 82.

26. History of United States Air Forces in Europe, 1 January-30 June 1966, Volume I, pp. 82-83. SECRET

27. Ibid..

28. Ibid..

29. History of Tactical Air Command, 1 July-31 December 1966, Volume I, p. 102. SECRET

30. History of Tactical Air Command, 1 January-30 June 1968, Volume I, pp. 69-70. SECRET

31. History of Tactical Air Command, 1 July 1972-30 June 1973, Volume I, p. 58. SECRET

3 32. Ibid., pp. 113-114.

33. History of Tactical Air Command, 1 July 1972-30 June 1973, Volume I, p. 113. SECRET

34. History of Tactical Air Command, 1 January-30 June 1962, Volume I, p. 158. SECRET

35. History of Tactical Air Command, 1 January-30 June 1961, Volume I, pp. 32-33. SECRET

NOTES ON CHAPTER VII

1. History of Tactical Air Command, 1 July 1970-30 June 1971, Volume 1, pp. 39-40. SECRET
2. History of United States Air Forces in Europe, Fiscal Year 1973, Volume 1, p. 174. SECRET
3. History of United States Air Forces in Europe, Fiscal Year 1974, Volume 1, p. 270. Hereafter cited as USAFE History, FY74. SECRET
4. History of Seventeenth Air Force, Fiscal Year 1974, Volume 1, p. 17. SECRET
5. Ibid..
6. History of United States Air Forces in Europe, Fiscal Year 1975, Volume 1, p. 71. Hereafter cited as USAFE History, FY75. SECRET
7. USAFE History, FY74, p. 271.
8. Personal letter to the author from Major General John W. Collens, Chief of Staff, Military Airlift Command, 11 October 1977. Hereafter cited as Collens.
9. USAFE History, FY74, p. 271.
10. USAFE History, FY75, p. 72.
11. Ibid..
12. Collens.
13. "Request for Information," Letter of Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, to the Author, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, 13 October 1977.
14. History of Directorate of Morale, Welfare, and Recreation, Assistant DCS/Personnel for Military Personnel, 1 July 1974-31 December 1974, pp. 4-5.
15. Personal notes of author, 1974-1976.
16. "Organization for Social Actions Programs," Message, 03/1405Z Aug71, USAFMPC to ALPERSCOM, Randolph AFB, Texas, Document 2 in History of 6486th Air Base Wing Social Actions, 1968-Oct 1971.

17. Education in Race Relations, AFR 50-26, Department of the Air Force, 2 December 1971, p. 2; Equal Opportunity and Treatment of Military Personnel, AFR 35-78, Department of the Air Force, 18 May 1971, p. 2; Illegal or Improper Use of Drugs, AFR 30-19, Department of the Air Force, 11 October 1973, p. 5; Alcohol Abuse, Control, and Rehabilitation, AFR 30-23, Department of the Air Force, 16 November 1973, p. 6; Social Actions Program, AFR 30-2, Department of the Air Force, 1 August 1974, p. 4.

18. Social Actions Program, AFR 30-2, Department of the Air Force, 8 November 1976, p. 1.2.

19. Air Force Glossary of Terms, AFM 11-1, Department of the Air Force, 2 January 1973.

20. Personal interview of author with Lieutenant Colonel Charles J. Wingert, Student AWC Class 1978 and former Chief of Social Actions, HQ USAF, 17 November 1977.

21. History of Tactical Air Command, 1 July-31 December 1975, Volume I, pp. 51-52. Hereafter cited as TAC History, Jul-Dec75. SECRET

22. Production Oriented Maintenance Organization (POMO), AFR 66-5, Department of the Air Force, 17 October 1977, p. i.

23. Ibid., p. 1.12.

24. Ibid., p. 1.11.

25. Ibid..

26. Ibid..

27. TAC History, Jul-Dec75, p. 53.

28. Personal telephone interview of author with Colonel Henry Conn, Commander, 68th BMW, Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina, 9 December 1977.

29. "Concept Feasibility Study on Organizational Management Alternatives for Headquarters Command," Draft contained in Six Man Group Which Became Part of 4 M-Panel, 1 Jan 74- 25 Nov 74, Special File K239.15-22, The Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, pp. 16-23, n.d..

NOTES ON CHAPTER VIII

1. Personal letter from the author to the Chiefs of Staff at SAC, MAC, PACAF, USAFE, and TAC, 23 September 1977.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Histories

ADC:

Air Defense Command Historical Study No. 9: 1955. SECRET

Headquarters Air Defense Command Semi-Annual Historical Report Number 2, December 1951. SECRET

History of 28th Air Division (SAGE), 1 January-31 December 1962, Volume I. SECRET

SAC:

History of Second Air Force, July-December 1959, Volume I. SECRET

History of Eighth Air Force, 1 January-30 June 1951. SECRET

History of Fifteenth Air Force, 1947, Volume I.

History of Fifteenth Air Force, July-December 1956, Volume I. SECRET

History of Fifteenth Air Force, July-December 1957, Volume I. SECRET

History of Fifteenth Air Force, January-June 1959, Volume I. SECRET

History of the 21st Air Division, November 1958. SECRET

History of the 704th Strategic Missile Wing (ICBM), 1 January-31 December 1958. SECRET

History of Strategic Air Command, 1947, Volume I.

History of Strategic Air Command, 1947, Volume III.

History Of Strategic Air Command, 1948, Volume I. SECRET

History of Strategic Air Command, 1949, Volume I. SECRET

History of Strategic Air Command, 1949, Volume II.

History of Strategic Air Command, 1 July 1954-30 June 1956, Volume I. SECRET

History of Strategic Air Command, 1 January 1957-30 June 1957, Historical Study No. 68, Volume I. SECRET

History of Strategic Air Command, June 1958-July 1959, Historical Study No. 76, Volume I. SECRET

History of the Strategic Air Command, 1 July 1959-31 December 1959, Historical Study No. 81. SECRET

TAC:

Air Ground Operations School History, April-June 1952.

History of Tactical Air Command, 1947, Volume I. SECRET

History of Tactical Air Command, 1 January 1957-30 June 1957, Volume I.

History of Tactical Air Command, 1 January-30 June 1961, Volume I. SECRET

History of Tactical Air Command, 1 July-31 December 1961, Volume I. SECRET

History of Tactical Air Command, 1 January-30 June 1962, Volume I. SECRET

History of Tactical Air Command, 1 July-31 December 1962, Volume I. SECRET

History of Tactical Air Command, 1 January-31 December 1965, Volume I. SECRET

History of Tactical Air Command, 1 January-30 June 1966, Volume I. SECRET

History of Tactical Air Command, 1 July-31 December 1966, Volume I. SECRET

History of Tactical Air Command, 1 January-30 June 1968, Volume I. SECRET

History of Tactical Air Command, 1 July 1970-30 June 1971, Volume I. SECRET

History of Tactical Air Command, 1 July 1972-30 June 1973, Volume I. SECRET

Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB,
Alabama, n.d.

History: Directorate of Manpower and Organization,
DCS/O-Headquarters USAF, 1 January 1955-30 June 1955.
SECRET

History: Directorate of Manpower and Organization,
DCS/O-Headquarters USAF, 1 July-31 December 1957.
SECRET

History of the Fifth Air Force, 1 January-30 June 1957,
Volume I. SECRET

History of the United States Air Force, ATC Pam 190-1,
Headquarters Air Training Command, 1 June 1961.

"Organization for Social Actions Programs," message,
03/1405Z August 1971, USAFMPC to ALPERSCOM, Randolph
Air Force Base, Texas, Document No. 2 in history of
6486th Air Base Wing Social Actions, 1968-October 1971.

Letters

"General Headquarters Air Force," Letter of Adjutant Gen-
eral, War Department, to all commanding generals,
special units, etc., Washington D.C., 31 December 1934,
in General Headquarters Air Force: Correspondence File
320.3: Organization GHQAF 1934-1938, The Albert F.
Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama,
n.d. Hereafter cited as GHQAF 1934-1938.

"General Headquarters Air Force," Letter of Commanding
General, GHQAF to Commanding General, 2nd Wing, 26
April 1937, GHQAF 1934-1938.

"Manpower Survey of Headquarters and Headquarters Squad-
rons, Strategic Air Command, Eighth Air Force, Fif-
teenth Air Force, and 311th Air Division," USAF/AFOOR
Letter to Chief of Staff, USAF, 8 September 1949, in
History of Strategic Air Command, 1949, Volume I. SECRET

"Organization of the GHQ Air Force," Letter of Command-
ing General, GHQ Air Force to Commanding General, 2nd
Wing, 26 April 1937, GHQAF 1934-1938.

"Procedures for Establishment of the New Wing-type Or-
ganization," AAF Letter 20-25, Headquarters, Army Air
Forces, 17 September 1947.

History of Tactical Air Command, 1 July-31 December 1975,
Volume I. SECRET

Lee, Brigadier General Robert M., "Recommendations on Wing-Base Plan of Organization as Prescribed by AF Regulation 20-15, 12 Dec 47," Exhibit 39-4, in History of Tactical Air Command, 1947.

"MEMORANDUM to the Wing Historical Officer, 62d Troop Carrier Wing, McChord Field, Washington, 15 January 1948," Exhibit 37, History of Tactical Air Command, 1947.

Old, Major General W. D., "Reorganization of Air Force Wings. 7 May 1948," Exhibit 39-5, History of Tactical Air Command, 1947.

"Supervisory Inspection, 1st Fighter Wing," Exhibit 36, History of Tactical Air Command, 1947.

USAFE:

History of Seventeenth Air Force, 1 January-30 June 1960,
Volume I. SECRET

History of Seventeenth Air Force, Fiscal Year 1947, Vol-
ume I. SECRET

History of United States Air Forces in Europe, 1 Janu-
ary-30 June 1961, Volume I. SECRET

History of United States Air Forces in Europe, 1 July-
31 December 1961, Volumes I and III. SECRET

History of United States Air Forces in Europe, 1 January-
30 June 1966, Volume I. SECRET

History of United States Air Forces in Europe, Fiscal
Year 1973, Volume I. SECRET

History of United States Air Forces in Europe, Fiscal Year
1974, Volume I. SECRET

History of United States Air Forces in Europe, Fiscal Year
1975, Volume I. SECRET

MISC.

Development of Administrative Planning and Control in the
AAF, Army Air Forces Historical Studies No. 28, The

"Reorganization of Air Defense Command," Letter of Commander, Air Defense Command to Chief of Staff USAF, 24 September 1951, Document 89 in Headquarters Air Defense Command Semi-annual Historical Report Number 2, December 1951, Volume I. SECRET

"Reorganization of Tactical Bombardment Wings and Air Base Groups," Hqs. SAC letter to Hqs. USAF, Offutt AFB, Nebraska, 29 March 1958, Exhibit 29 in History of Strategic Air Command, June 1958-July 1959, Historical Study No. 76, Volume IV.

"Request for Information," Letter from author to Chiefs of Staff: SAC, MAC, PACAF, USAFE, and TAC, 23 September 1977.

"Request for Information," Letter of Chief, Office of History, Headquarters Air Defense Command to author, Colorado Springs, 30 September 1977.

"Request for Information," Letter of Chief of Staff, Headquarters Military Airlift Command to author, Scott AFB, Illinois, 11 October 1977.

"Request for Information," Letter of Chief of Staff, Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe to author, APO New York 09012, 14 October 1977.

"Request for Information," Letter Of Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, to author, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, 13 October 1977.

"Standard Wing/Base Organization," Letter from Commander, Air Defense Command (ADC), to all ADC Air Divisions, Colorado Springs, 14 December 1962, Document No. 5, Documents 1-29 to 28th Air Divisions (SAGE) History, January-December 1962, Volume I. SECRET

Manuals and Regulations

Air Force Glossary of Terms, AFM 11-1, Department of the Air Force, 2 January 1973.

Alcohol Abuse Control and Rehabilitation, AFR 30-23, Department of the Air Force, 16 November 1973.

Command Jurisdiction Over Certain AAF Activities and Facilities in the Continental United States, AAF Regulation 20-31, Headquarters Army Air Forces, 22 December 1943.

Companies: General Provisions, Army Regulation 245-5, War Department, 20 July 1925.

Education in Race Relations, AFR 50-26, Department of the Air Force, 2 December 1971.

Equal Opportunity and Treatment of Military Personnel, AFR 35-78, 18 May 1971.

Illegal or Improper Use of Drugs, AFR 30-19, Department of the Air Force, 11 October 1973.

Organization of Air Force Operating Units, AFR 20-15, Department of the Air Force, 19 August 1955.

ORGANIZATION: Organization of Air Force Combat Wings, AFR 20-15, Department of the Air Force, 13 December 1948.

Organization and Designation of USAF Units, AFR 20-27, Department of the Air Force, 2 October 1959.

Organization Principles and Policies for the USAF, AFR 20-1, Department of the Air Force, 15 April 1953.

Organization Policy and Guidance, AFM 26-2, Department of the Air Force, 11 December 1964.

Organization Policy and Guidance, AFM 26-2, Department of the Air Force, 15 March 1966.

Organization Policy and Guidance, AFM 26-2, Department of the Air Force, 7 May 1970.

Organization: Reorganization of AAF Base Units and Installations, AAFR 20-15, Headquarters Army Air Forces, 27 June 1947.

Production Oriented Maintenance Organization (POMO), AFR 66-5, Department of the Air Force, 17 October 1977.

Reorganization of AAF Base Units and Installations, Army-Air Force Regulation 20-15, Headquarters AAF, 27 June 1947, para 4.

"SAC Regulation 66-12, Dated August 1949," Department of the Air Force, 23 November 1949, in History of Strategic Air Command, 1949, Volume I. SECRET

Social Actions Program, AFR 30-2 Department of the Air

Force, 1 August 1974.

Social Actions Program, AFR 30-2, Department of the Air Force, 8 November 1976.

Standardization and Stabilization of Air Force Organization, AFR 20-53, Department of the Air Force, 21 October 1949.

Studies and Reports

Bogoslofski, Colonel B.J., Tactical Fighter Wing Commander or Domestic Action Leader?, Air War College, Professional Study, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1973.

"Concept Feasibility Study on Organizational/Management Alternatives for Headquarters Command," Draft contained in Six Man Group Which Became Part of 4 M-Panel, 1 Jan 74-25 Nov 74, Special File K 239.15-22, The Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, n.d.

Erdin, Lieutenant Colonel R.A., A Study of the Wing-Base Organization, Air Command and Staff School, Professional Study, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1949.

Golden, Lieutenant Colonel W.F., "Report of Visit to Shaw Field with AAF Manning Survey Board and TAC O&M Team, 13 May 47," Exhibit 15, History of Tactical Air Command, 1947, VOL I.

Hart, Lieutenant Colonel Ernest J., Organization For Command: An Analysis of the Historical Trends and Modern Requirements, Air War College, Professional Study, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, May 1960.

Hartsell, Major H.F., The Wing Staff Organization, Air Command and Staff College, Professional Study, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1965.

Martindale, Lieutenant Colonel Ward W., An Analysis of the New Wing-Base Organization, Air Command and Staff School, Professional Study, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1946.

McNabb, Lieutenant Colonel John M., An Analysis of the New Wing Base Organization, Air Command and Staff School, Professional Study, Maxwell Air Force Base,

Alabama, October 1948.

Ogden, Captain (USN) James R., "An Evaluation of Air Force Organizational Philosophy," Air War College, Professional Paper, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 22 April 1953.

Proposed Organization of the Peace Time Air Force, an Interim Report by the Ad Hoc Committee on Air Force Reorganization, Draft only, Air University Library, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, n.d.

The Question of Autonomy for the United States Air Arm: 1907-1945, Part II, Air University Documentary Research Study, Air University Library, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1950.

Shuck, Colonel J.E., Organizational Requirements for the USAF, Air War College, Professional Study, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, April 1950.

Trudeau, Major Carvil A., Wing Reorganization, Air Command and Staff School, Professional Study, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 20 May 1954.

Miscellanea

Heinlein, Robert, "Thoughts...on the Business of Life," Forbes, September 17, 1977, p. 284.

Kahn, Lieutenant Colonel Robert, USAF Res., "What's Happened to the Squadron Commander," Air Force Magazine, June 1953.

Personal interview with Major General James B. Tipton, USAF (Ret), 26 September 1977.

"Strategic Air Command--The Deterrent Force," Air Force Magazine, August 1957.

"What's in a Wing?," Air Force Magazine, September 1953.

"What Is a Combat Wing?," Flying Magazine, May 1951.

LTC Gary D. Sheets
AWC Box 211
Maxwell AFB AL 36112

APPENDIX A-1

WING-BASE ORGANIZATION
OPINION SURVEY
4 Oct 77

In fulfillment of the Air War College Military Studies Program requirement, I am writing a research paper titled "A History of Wing-Base Organization and Considerations for Change." The purpose of the study is not to champion any particular viewpoint, but rather to document the evolution of our existing structure and then to examine current opinions and organizational theory in light of future organizational requirements. This examination is limited to bases embracing the Tri-Deputy organization.

MAJCOM viewpoints have been requested by separate correspondence, but equally important are the views of those who have held or are presently occupying key positions at base level. Your completion of this brief survey will be most helpful.

This survey has been approved by HQ AFMPC/DPMYPS IAW AFR 12-35. Authority to collect this information is outlined in 10 USC 8012. Data will be analyzed by recognized statistical methods and will be included in the study which should receive broad distribution. Your participation in this survey is entirely voluntary. No adverse action of any kind may be taken against any individual who elects not to so participate.

1. Please provide the following information.

<u>present title</u>	<u>command</u> (TAC, etc.)	<u>months</u> in job	<u>rank</u>
----------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------	-------------

2. On 1 July 1975 the Tri-Deputy organization was implemented. Goals of the reorganization were to enhance the quality of aircraft maintenance, to intensify the management of resources, and to provide greater emphasis for people programs. Please rate how you feel the Tri-Deputy structure has contributed toward fulfillment of these goals, according to the following criteria. (See next page.)

APPENDIX A-2

- | | | |
|--------------------------|-------|---------------------|
| 5 - Greatly enhanced | _____ | quality of aircraft |
| 4 - Enhanced | _____ | maintenance |
| 3 - Adequately fulfilled | _____ | emphasis for people |
| 2 - Degraded | _____ | programs |
| 1 - Greatly degraded | _____ | mgmt of resources |

3. Using the same rating criteria as in question 2, please rate how you feel the Tri-Deputy organization has fulfilled the five principles of organization as contained in AFM 26-2.

- _____ unity of command
- _____ span of control
- _____ functional grouping
- _____ delegation of authority
- _____ decision making

4. How satisfied are you with the current Wing/Base Tri-Deputy structure of Wing Comdr, Wing Vice Comdr, Dep Comdr Ops, Dep Comdr Resource Mgt, Dep Comdr Maint, and Cmbt Spt Gp Comdr (Base Comdr), and Hosp Comdr? Circle one.

- a. Totally satisfied
- b. More than satisfied
- c. Satisfied
- d. Slightly dissatisfied
- e. Totally dissatisfied

5. Using the following measurement criteria (and your own value system to define "average"), please relatively rate each position as to your perception of its workload, job satisfaction and career progression. Also, circle Col or LTC where provided to identify the rank of the incumbent. If the incumbent is a colonel selectee, circle colonel. All other positions are assumed to be occupied by O-6s or O-6 selectees.

- 5 - Well above average
- 4 - Above average
- 3 - Average
- 2 - Below average
- 1 - Well below average

APPENDIX A-3

Position	Workload	Job Satisfaction	Provides Positive Career Progression
Wing Comdr			
Vice Wing Comdr			
DC Ops			
*Asst DC Ops (Col or LTC)			
DC Maint			
*Asst DC Maint (Col or LTC)			
DC Resource Mgt			
*Asst DCR (Col or LTC)			
Combt Spt Gp Comdr			
*Combt Spt Gp Dep Comdr (Col or LTC)			

* Circle Col or LTC for these positions

6. If given full latitude to change existing Wing-Base organizational structure, what would you change and why?
(Continue on back page as necessary.)

7. If one O-6 position were to be reduced to an O-5 position at your base, which one would you recommend?

APPENDIX B
SURVEY RESULTS

Number of Respondents							
	<u>SAC</u>	<u>MAC</u>	<u>PACAF</u>	<u>USAFE</u>	<u>TAC</u>	<u>TOT</u>	<u>%</u>
Wg/CC	6	1	2	4	7	20	65
Wg/CV	8	2	4	3	5	22	71
DCO	10	1	4	4	3	22	71
ADCO	9	2	2	3	4	20	65
DCM	10	3	4	4	4	25	81
ADCM	7	1	2	1	3	14	45
DCR	6	2	4	4	6	22	71
ADCR	6	1	1	3	4	15	48
CSG/CC	5	1	2	3	4	15	48
CSG/CD	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>61</u>
Total	72	17	27	32	46	194	63%
No. Surveys mailed	90	40	40	70	70	310	
% Rtn'd	80%	43%	68%	46%	66%	63%	

APPENDIX B-2

Question 2

Quality of Aircraft Maintenance (Ratings Marked)

	SAC					MAC					PACAF					USAFE					TAC					TOTAL				
	5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1
ME/CC	2	2	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	2	4	0	0	2	6	11	0	0
WG/CV	1	3	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	8	9	0	0
DCO	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	1	2	0	1	10	11	0	0
ADCO	1	2	4	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	2	0	1	5	11	0	0
DCM	1	0	7	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	2	2	0	0	6	4	16	1	0
ADCM	0	1	6	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	5	7	0	0
Mean																														
Rating	3.51					4.0					3.61					3.50					3.23					14 38 65 1 0				

Of 118 respondents, only one felt that the tri-deputy structure had degraded the quality of maintenance.

Rating Percentage-By Command

Rating	5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1
5	11.1%	22.2%	16.7%	11.1%	8.3%	11.1%	22.2%	16.7%	11.1%	8.3%	11.1%	22.2%	16.7%	11.1%	8.3%	11.1%	22.2%	16.7%	11.1%	8.3%	11.1%	22.2%	16.7%	11.1%	8.3%	11.1%	22.2%	16.7%	11.1%	8.3%
4	28.9	55.6	27.8	33.3	45.8	28.9	55.6	27.8	33.3	45.8	28.9	55.6	27.8	33.3	45.8	28.9	55.6	27.8	33.3	45.8	28.9	55.6	27.8	33.3	45.8	28.9	55.6	27.8	33.3	45.8
3	60.0	22.2	55.6	50.0	45.8	60.0	22.2	55.6	50.0	45.8	60.0	22.2	55.6	50.0	45.8	60.0	22.2	55.6	50.0	45.8	60.0	22.2	55.6	50.0	45.8	60.0	22.2	55.6	50.0	45.8
2	0	0	0	5.6	0	0	0	0	5.6	0	0	0	0	5.6	0	0	0	0	5.6	0	0	0	0	0	5.6	0	0	0	5.6	0
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

APPENDIX B-3

Question 2

Emphasis for People Programs												
	SAC		MAC		PACAF		USAFE		TAC		TOTAL	
	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1
Wg/CC	1 3 2 0 0	0 0 1 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 3 1 0 0	0 3 1 0 0	0 2 5 0 0	0 2 5 0 0	1 8 11	0 0
Wg/CY	0 3 5 0 0	0 0 1 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 1 1 0 0	0 1 1 0 0	0 1 3 0 0	0 1 3 0 0	1 8 11	0 0
DCC	1 2 7 0 0	0 0 1 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	1 1 2 0 0	1 1 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	3 5 14	0 0
ADCO	1 5 3 0 0	0 0 1 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 3 0 0	0 0 3 0 0	0 0 3 0 0	0 0 3 0 0	2 7 10	0 0
DCM	0 3 6 0 0	0 0 1 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 3 0 0	0 0 3 0 0	5 7 12	0 0
ADCM	0 5 2 0 0	0 0 1 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 3 0 0	0 0 3 0 0	6 7 10	0 0
DCR	0 3 3 0 0	0 0 1 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 3 0 0	0 0 3 0 0	0 0 3 0 0	0 0 3 0 0	1 9 5	0 0
ADCR	1 4 1 - 0	0 0 1 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 3 0 0	0 0 3 0 0	0 0 3 0 0	0 0 3 0 0	1 9 5	0 0
CSG/CC	0 2 2 0 0	0 0 1 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	0 0 3 0 0	0 0 3 0 0	0 0 3 0 0	0 0 3 0 0	1 5 7	0 0
CSG/CD	0 3 2 (1) 0	0 0 1 2 0	0 0 1 1 0	0 0 1 1 0	0 0 1 1 0	0 0 1 1 0	0 0 2 (1) 0	0 0 2 (1) 0	0 0 2 3 0	0 0 2 3 0	0 7 9	2 0
Replies	% of 71		% of 16		% of 25		% of 30		% of 42		% of 183	
5	5.6		25.0		24.0		3.3		7.1		9.8	
4	46.4		31.3		32.0		33.3		38.1		39.3	
3	46.4		43.7		44.0		60.0		54.8		49.7	
2	1.5		0.0		0.0		3.3		0.0		1.1	
1	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
	99.9		100.0		100.0		99.9		100.0		99.0	
Mean Rating	3.56		3.81		3.50		3.37		3.52		3.60	

() Marked a rating of 2 or 1.

APPENDIX B-4

Question 2

Management of Resources									
	SAC	MAC	PACAF	USAFE	TAC	Response Average			
	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1				
Vg/CC	2 3 - (1) -	- 1 - - -	- 1 1 - -	2 1 1 - -	- 6 1 - -	3.95			
WG/CV	4 4 - - -	- 1 - - -	- 3 1 - -	- 2 1 - -	1 3 1 - -	3.65			
DCO	1 7 2 - -	- - (1) -	- 1 2 1 -	- 1 2 1 -	- 2 1 - -	3.36			
ADCO	1 6 2 - -	- 1 1 - -	- 2 1 - -	- 1 1 1 -	- 2 1 - -	3.95			
DCM	- 6 3 - -	2 1 - - -	- 1 2 1 -	- 2 1 (1) -	- 3 1 - -	4.00			
ADCM	- 3 3 (1) -	- 1 - - -	- 2 - - -	- 1 - - -	- 1 1 (1) -	3.50			
DCR	4 2 - - -	2 - - - -	- 3 - - -	- 4 - - -	- 3 2 - -	4.60			
ADCR	6 - - - -	- 1 - - -	- 1 - - -	- 2 1 - -	- 2 2 - -	4.47			
CSG/CC	- 3 1 - -	- 1 - - -	- 2 - - -	- 1 1 (1) -	- 2 1 - -	3.62			
CSG/CD	1 3 1 (1) -	- - 3 - -	- 2 - - -	- 1 1 (2) -	- 2 1 - -	3.53			
						3.84			
Mean Rating	4.01	3.94	4.04	3.42	4.05				
Rating	% of 71	% of 16	% of 26	% of 31	% of 42	% of 186			
5	26.8	31.3	19.2	22.6	26.2	25.3			
4	52.1	37.5	65.4	42.0	54.8	51.6			
3	16.9	25.0	15.4	22.6	16.7	18.3			
2	4.2	6.2	0.0	12.9	2.4	4.8			
1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

() Marked 2 or 1.

APPENDIX B-5

Question 3

Unity of Command										
	SAC	MAC	PACAF	USAFE	TAC	RESPONSE				
	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	AVERAGE				
Wg/CC	1-3-2	-	-	-	-	3.48				
Wg/CV	2-4-2	-	-	-	-	3.85				
DCO	2-3-5(1)	-	-	-	-	3.57				
ADCO	1-3-3(2)	-	-	-	-	3.50				
DCM	-	3-6	-	-	-	3.75				
ADCM	-	1-5(1)	-	-	-	3.36				
DCR	-	3-3	-	-	-	3.90				
ADCR	4-2	-	-	-	-	4.27				
CSG/CC	-	1-2(2)	-	-	-	3.21				
CSG/CD	1-3	-	-	-	-	3.21				
Mean Rating	3.54	3.65	3.78	3.37	3.77	3.61				
Rating	% of 71	% of 17	% of 27	% of 30	% of 44	% of 129				
5	14.1	17.6	18.5	6.7	13.6	13.8				
4	36.6	35.3	44.4	40.0	50.0	41.3				
3	39.4	41.2	33.3	36.7	36.4	37.6				
2	8.5	5.9	3.7	16.7	0.0	6.9				
1	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5				
	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.1				

APPENDIX B-6

Question 3

Span of Control

	SAC	MAC	PACAF	USAFE	TAC	RESPONSE
	5-4-3-2-1-	5-4-3-2-1-	5-4-3-2-1-	5-4-3-2-1-	5-4-3-2-1-	Average
Wg/CC	2-2 1(1)-	- 2 - - -	- 1 - (1)-	- 2 2 - -	- 4 3 - -	3.62
Wg/CV	3 4 1 - -	- 1 - - -	- 3 1 - -	- 2 - - -	- 1 2 1(1)-	4.00
DCO	2 4 4 - -	- 1 - - -	- 1 3 - -	- 1 2 1 - -	- 1 - 2 - -	3.86
ADCO	1 5 1(2)-	- 1 - - -	- 1 1 - -	- 2 1 - -	- 1 2 1 - -	3.75
DCM	2 5 2 - -	- 2 1 - -	- 2 2 - -	- 2 - (2)-	- 2 2 1 - -	4.08
ADCM	- 3 3(1)-	- 1 - - -	- 1 1 - -	- 1 - - -	- 2 2 1 - -	3.85
DCR	4 2 1 - -	- 1 - - -	- 2 2 - -	- 3 - - -	- 3 2 - -	4.43
ADCR	4 1 - - -	- 1 - - -	- 1 1 - -	- 1 2 - -	- 4 - - -	4.43
CSG/CC	- 6 - - -	- 1 - - -	- 1 1 - -	- 2 - (1)-	- 2 1 - -	3.64
CSG/CD	4 1 - - -	- 2 1 - -	- 1 - (1)-	- 2 1 - -	- 3 2 1 - -	3.95
Mean	4.08	4.18	4.0	3.57	3.98	3.93
Rating						
Rating	% of 70	% of 17	% of 27	% of 30	% of 44	% of 188
5	30.0	29.4	22.2	6.7	25.0	23.9
4	45.7	52.9	59.3	56.7	50.0	51.1
3	18.6	17.6	11.1	23.3	22.7	19.1
2	5.7	0.0	7.4	13.3	2.3	5.9
1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

APPENDIX B-7

Question 3

Functional Grouping										
	SAC	MAC	PACAF	USAFE	TAC	Response Average				
	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1					
VE/CC	2 2 1(1)-	1 - - (1)-	- 1 - (1)-	1 2 - (1)-	- 3 4 - -	3.57				
Wg/CV	1 5 2 - -	- 1 - - -	- 2 2 - -	- 2 - - -	- 2 1 - -	3.90				
DCO	2 5 3 - -	- - - (1)-	- 2 2 - -	1 1 - (2)-	- 2 1 - -	3.77				
ADCO	2 6 - - (1)	- 1 1 - -	- 1 1 - -	- 2 1 - -	- 2 1 1 -	3.85				
DCM	- 5 2 (2)-	1 1 1 - -	- 2 2 - -	- 3 - (1)-	- 3 1 - -	3.88				
ADCN	1 3 1(1)1	- 1 1 - -	- 1 1 - -	- 1 - - -	- 3 - - -	3.64				
DCR	4 - 2 - -	1 1 - - -	- 2 1 1 -	- 2 1 - -	- 4 1 - -	4.10				
ADCR	4 1 1 - -	1 - - - -	- 1 - - -	- 3 - - -	- 1 2 1 -	4.33				
CSG/CC	- 1 2 (2)-	- 1 - - -	- 1 1 - -	- 1 1 (1)-	- - 3 - -	3.07				
CSG/CD	1 4 - - -	- - 3 - -	- - 1 - (1)-	- - 2 (1)-	- - 3 3 - -	3.42				
Mean Rating	3.77	3.71	3.96	3.47	3.84	3.76				
Rating	% of 73	% of 17	% of 27	% of 30	% of 44	% of 189				
5	23.3	23.5	29.6	6.7	18.2	20.6				
4	43.8	35.3	44.4	53.3	47.7	46.0				
3	21.9	29.4	18.5	20.0	34.1	24.9				
2	8.2	11.8	7.4	20.0	0.0	7.9				
1	2.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5				
	99.9	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0	99.9				

APPENDIX B-8

Question 3

Delegation of Authority										
	SAC	MAC	PACAF	USAFE	TAC	RESPONSE				
	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	Average				
WG/CC	2 1 3 - -	- - - - -	- 1 1 - -	- 3 1 - -	- 5 2 - -	3.52				
WG/CV	2 5 1 - -	- - - - -	- 3 - (1) -	- 2 - - -	- 2 3 - -	3.75				
DCO	3 5 2 - -	- - - - -	- 1 2 1 - -	- 2 1 (1) -	- 1 2 - -	3.77				
ADCO	1 5 3 - -	- - - - -	- 1 1 1 - -	- 1 - 3 - -	- 3 1 - -	3.70				
DCM	- 6 2 (1) -	- - - - -	- 2 2 - - -	- 1 - 3 - -	- 3 - 1 - -	3.88				
ADCM	- 4 1 (2) -	- - - - -	- 1 - 1 - -	- 1 - 1 - -	- 1 2 2 - -	3.71				
DCR	1 2 3 - -	- - - - -	- 2 2 - - -	- 2 1 - - -	- 1 2 2 - -	3.90				
ADCR	4 - 2 - -	- - - - -	- 1 - 1 - -	- 2 1 - - -	- 3 1 - -	4.13				
CSG/CC	- 1 2 (2) -	- - - - -	- 1 1 1 - -	- 2 - (1) -	- 1 2 - -	3.23				
CSG/CD	1 3 - (1) -	- - - - -	- - 2 - -	- - (3) -	- 1 2 3 - -	3.26				
Mean Rating										
5	18.6	23.5	22.2	3.3	13.6	16.0				
4	44.3	11.8	48.1	46.7	47.7	43.1				
3	30.0	64.7	25.9	33.3	38.7	35.1				
2	7.1	0.0	3.7	16.7	0.0	5.8				
1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0				
	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0				
() Rated 2 or 1										

APPENDIX B-9

Question 3

Decision Making

	SAC				MAC				PACAF				USAFE				TAC				Response Average
	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1
WE/CC	2	1	2	(1)	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	2	2	-	-	3	4	-	-	3.43
WE/CV	2	5	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	3	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	5	-	-	3.70
DCO	2	5	3	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	1	-	2	2	-	-	2	1	-	-	3.64
ADCO	2	4	3	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	-	-	1	2	-	-	3	1	-	-	3.85
DCM	-	6	2	(1)	-	-	2	1	-	2	2	-	2	1	(1)	-	3	1	-	-	4.00
ADCM	-	3	2	(2)	-	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	2	-	-	2	1	-	-	3.57
DCR	-	5	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	3	3	-	1	2	-	-	3	1	-	-	3.90
ADCR	4	-	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	2	1	-	-	4	-	-	-	4.13
CSG/CC	-	2	-	(3)	-	-	-	(1)	-	2	-	-	1	2	-	-	1	2	-	-	3.14
CSG/CD	1	3	-	-	(1)	-	-	1	(2)	-	1	-	-	-	(3)	-	1	2	3	-	3.05
Rating	% of 70				% of 17				% of 27				% of 30				% of 44				% of 188
5	18.6	18.6	18.6	18.6	23.5	23.5	23.5	23.5	28.5	28.5	28.5	28.5	3.33	3.33	3.33	3.33	11.4	11.4	11.4	11.4	14.9
4	48.6	48.6	48.6	48.6	35.3	35.3	35.3	35.3	55.6	55.6	55.6	55.6	40.0	40.0	40.0	40.0	47.7	47.7	47.7	47.7	46.8
3	21.4	21.4	21.4	21.4	23.5	23.5	23.5	23.5	22.2	22.2	22.2	22.2	43.3	43.3	43.3	43.3	40.9	40.9	40.9	40.9	29.8
2	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	17.6	17.6	17.6	17.6	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	13.3	13.3	13.3	13.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.0
1	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9	99.9	99.9	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9	99.9	99.9	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mean Rating	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.65	3.65	3.65	3.65	3.89	3.89	3.89	3.89	3.33	3.33	3.33	3.33	3.70	3.70	3.70	3.70	3.68
(, Rated 2 or 1																					

APPENDIX B-10

Question 4

Satisfaction With Tri-Deputy Structure

	SAC		MAC		PACAF		USAFE		TAC		% Who Marked 1 or 2
	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	5-4-3-2-1	
Wg/CC	- 2 1 (2) 1	- 1 1 - -	- 1 (1) -	- 1 (1) -	- 1 (1) -	- 1 (1) -	- 1 (1) -	- 1 (1) -	- 1 (1) -	- 1 (1) -	23.8
Wg/CV	2 3 3 - -	- 1 - - -	- 1 3 - -	- 1 3 - -	- 1 3 - -	- 1 3 - -	- 1 3 - -	- 1 3 - -	- 1 3 - -	- 1 3 - -	5.0
DCO	3 3 4 - -	- 1 - (1) -	- 1 1 2 -	- 1 1 2 -	- 1 1 2 -	- 1 1 2 -	- 1 1 2 -	- 1 1 2 -	- 1 1 2 -	- 1 1 2 -	4.5
ADCO	3 1 4 (1) -	- 2 - - -	- 1 1 (1) -	- 1 1 (1) -	- 1 1 (1) -	- 1 1 (1) -	- 1 1 (1) -	- 1 1 (1) -	- 1 1 (1) -	- 1 1 (1) -	10.0
DCM	2 1 4 (2) -	- 2 1 - -	- 3 1 - -	- 3 1 - -	- 3 1 - -	- 3 1 - -	- 3 1 - -	- 3 1 - -	- 3 1 - -	- 3 1 - -	12.5
ADCM	- 1 5 (1) -	- 1 - - -	- 1 - - -	- 1 - - -	- 1 - - -	- 1 - - -	- 1 - - -	- 1 - - -	- 1 - - -	- 1 - - -	7.1
DCR	4 2 - - -	- 1 - - -	- 3 1 - -	- 3 1 - -	- 3 1 - -	- 3 1 - -	- 3 1 - -	- 3 1 - -	- 3 1 - -	- 3 1 - -	0.0
ADCR	4 1 1 - -	- 1 - - -	- 1 - - -	- 1 - - -	- 1 - - -	- 1 - - -	- 1 - - -	- 1 - - -	- 1 - - -	- 1 - - -	0.0
CSG/CC	1 - 1 (3) -	- 1 - - -	- 1 1 - -	- 1 1 - -	- 1 1 - -	- 1 1 - -	- 1 1 - -	- 1 1 - -	- 1 1 - -	- 1 1 - -	28.6
CSG/CD	1 2 1 - (1)	- 2 (1) -	- 1 - (1) -	- 1 - (1) -	- 1 - (1) -	- 1 - (1) -	- 1 - (1) -	- 1 - (1) -	- 1 - (1) -	- 1 - (1) -	31.6
Mean Rating	3.54	3.59	3.70	3.70	3.39	3.86					
Rating	% of 71		% of 17		% of 27		% of 31		% of 44		% of 190
5	28.2	17.6	29.6	22.6	22.6	25.0	25.8	25.8	25.0	25.8	25.8
4	22.5	35.3	22.2	25.8	25.8	40.9	28.4	28.4	40.9	28.4	28.4
3	31.8	35.1	37.0	32.3	32.3	31.8	33.7	33.7	31.8	33.7	33.7
2	12.7	11.8	11.1	19.4	19.4	2.3	11.1	11.1	2.3	11.1	11.1
1	2.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	1.1	0.0	1.1	1.1
	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.1	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

() Marked 2 or 1

APPENDIX B-11

Question 5

Rating of Career Progression Perceptions

5-Well above average	<u>Viewed by Wg/CC (19)</u>	
4-Above average		
3-Average	Wg/CC 4.74	CSG/CC 3.26
2-Below Average	Wg/CV 4.25	CSG/CD 3.17
1-Well below average	DCO 4.47	
	ADCO 4.05	
	DCM 3.63	
	ADCM 3.45	
	DCR 3.10	
	ADCR 3.06	

Viewed by Wg/CV (21 Replies)

	<u>SAC</u>	<u>MAC</u>	<u>PACAF</u>	<u>USAFE</u>	<u>TAC</u>	<u>WEIGHTED AVERAGE</u>
Wg/CC	4.63	5.00	4.67	5.00	4.60	4.71
Wg/CV	4.38	5.00	3.00	5.00	4.20	4.19
DCO	4.25	5.00	4.50	4.50	4.40	4.43
DCM	4.00	4.50	3.00	3.50	3.20	3.62
DCR	3.75	3.00	3.50	3.00	3.40	3.48
CSG/CC	4.25	4.00	2.50	4.00	3.20	3.62
No.						
Replies	8	2	4	2	5	21

Viewed by DCO (21 Replies)

	<u>SAC</u>	<u>MAC</u>	<u>PACAF</u>	<u>USAFE</u>	<u>TAC</u>	<u>WIEIGHTED AVERAGE</u>
Wg/CC	4.89	5.00	5.00	4.50	5.00	4.86
Wg/CV	4.67	5.00	4.75	4.33	4.67	4.62
DCO	4.50	5.00	4.25	4.25	5.00	4.50
DCM	4.11	4.00	4.50	3.75	3.33	4.00
DCR	3.44	1.00	4.00	3.00	3.00	3.29
CSG/CC	4.11	3.00	4.25	3.00	3.33	3.76
No.						
Replies	9	1	4	4	3	21

APPENDIX B-12

Question 5

Rating of Career Progression Perceptions

Viewed by DCM (22 Replies)

	<u>SAC</u>	<u>MAC</u>	<u>PACAF</u>	<u>USAFE</u>	<u>TAC</u>	<u>WEIGHTED AVERAGE</u>
Wg/CC	4.67	5.00	4.75	4.33	5.00	4.73
Wg/CV	4.14	4.50	4.50	3.67	4.75	4.27
DCO	3.78	4.50	4.50	4.33	4.75	4.23
DCM	3.67	4.50	2.50	2.67	3.75	3.41
DCR	2.67	4.50	3.25	2.67	3.00	3.00
CSG/CC	3.44	4.50	3.75	3.00	3.00	3.45
No. Replies	9	2	4	3	4	22

Viewed by DCR (20 Replies)

	<u>SAC</u>	<u>MAC</u>	<u>PACAF</u>	<u>USAFE</u>	<u>TAC</u>	<u>WEIGHTED AVERAGE</u>
Wg/CC	5.00	5.00	5.00	4.00	5.00	4.80
Wg/CV	4.67	4.00	4.25	3.50	4.40	4.25
DCO	4.50	4.00	4.75	4.50	4.60	4.55
DCM	3.67	2.00	3.50	4.50	3.20	3.60
DCR	3.17	2.00	3.25	4.50	2.60	3.25
CSG/CC	3.83	----	4.00	3.00	2.80	3.42
No. Replies	6	1	4	4	5	20

Viewed by CSG/CC (15 Replies)

	<u>SAC</u>	<u>MAC</u>	<u>PACAF</u>	<u>USAFE</u>	<u>TAC</u>	<u>WEIGHTED AVERAGE</u>
Wg/CC	5.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	4.75	4.67
Wg/CV	4.00	4.00	3.50	4.33	4.50	4.13
DCO	4.40	3.00	3.50	4.33	4.00	4.07
DCM	4.20	4.00	4.00	2.67	4.25	3.93
DCR	3.20	3.00	3.50	3.00	3.00	3.53
CSG/CC	3.60	3.00	3.50	3.33	3.75	3.53
No. Replies	5	1	2	3	4	15

APPENDIX B-13

Question 5

Rating of Career Progression Perceptions

Unweighted Consolidated View (119 Replies)

	<u>SAC</u>	<u>MAC</u>	<u>PACAF</u>	<u>USAFE</u>	<u>TAC</u>	<u>AVERAGE</u>
Wg/CC	4.82	4.62	4.69	4.60	4.85	4.72
Wg/CV	4.35	4.46	4.04	4.18	4.46	4.30
DCO	4.32	4.33	4.33	4.40	4.33	4.34
DCM	3.88	3.77	3.52	3.45	3.56	3.64
DCR	3.22	2.77	3.43	3.21	3.02	3.13
CSG/CC	3.75	3.55	3.54	3.27	3.51	3.52
No. Replies	43	8	20	20	28	119

Question 5

Workload as Viewed by Wing Commanders

	<u>SAC</u>	<u>MAC</u>	<u>PACAF</u>	<u>USAFE</u>	<u>TAC</u>	<u>Average</u>	<u>No. Replies</u>
Wg/CC	5.00	5.00	4.5	4.5	4.57	4.70	20
Wg/CV	4.17	4.0	4.5	4.0	3.86	4.05	20
DCO	4.17	5.0	4.0	5.0	4.43	4.42	19
ADCO	3.5	4.0	4.0	3.75	3.86	3.75	20
DCM	4.83	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.57	4.79	19
ADCM	3.83	4.0	4.5	3.75	4.0	3.94	18
DCR	3.80	4.0	3.0	3.75	3.71	3.68	19
ADCR	3.60	2.0	3.0	3.33	3.14	3.24	17
CSG/CC	4.2	5.0	5.0	4.5	4.29	4.42	19
CSG/CD	3.6	4.0	4.0	3.75	3.57	3.67	18
No. Replies	6	1	2	4	7	N/A	20

APPENDIX B-14

Question 6

Organizational changes recommended by respondents.

Wing Commanders

SAC N/C (No Change)
SAC CSG/CC to Dep Comdr for Support; Wg/CC Base Comdr.
SAC CSG/CC to Dep Comdr for Support; Wg/CC Base Comdr.
SAC CSG/CC to Dep Comdr for Support; Wg/CC Base Comdr.
SAC N/C
SAC Eliminate DCR; Supply under DCM, all else to CSG.
MAC N/C; We change too often.
PACAF N/C; CSG/CC needs a deputy.
PACAF N/C; This wing too large for one organization.
USAFE N/C; Fewer directives from HHQ which cannot be delegated.
USAFE N/C; Too many O-6s on this base.
USAFE N/C
USAFE N/C
TAC Supply under DCM.
TAC B/Gen over dual-wing base is best.
TAC N/C
TAC N/C

Vice Wing Commanders

SAC CSG/CC to Dep Comdr for Support; Wg/CC Base Comdr.
SAC CSG/CC to Dep Comdr for Support; Wg/CC Base Comdr.
SAC CSG/CC to Dep Comdr for Support; Wg/CC Base Comdr.
SAC N/C; Planning between organizations is a problem.
SAC CSG/CC to Dep Comdr for Support; Ranking guy Base CC.
SAC N/C; Regulations are confusing as to responsibilities of Base CC and Wg/CC. They conflict.
SAC N/C
SAC N/C; At dual bomber/missile wings, create Sec Pol as a Group reporting to host wing comdr.

APPENDIX B-15

Question 6 Cont.

Vice Wing Commander Comments

MAC N/C

MAC Return to old system; supply under DCM, all else of DCR under CSG/CC.

PACAF N/C; There should be a full time base inspector/IG assigned to this base. Ties down Wg/CV.

PACAF N/C; VC needs greater respons. IG be separate agency from VC.

PACAF N/C; Flexibility more important than fixed organ.

USAFE N/C; Not using Tri-Deputy.

USAFE N/C; Eliminate Hq Sqs and give respons to Dep Comdrs.

USAFE RM not a full time job; place personnel under RM.

TAC Place supply under DCM

TAC N/C; Eliminate ADCR and add Wing Exec.

TAC Main improvement to be achieved in job assignments, job progression, and job turnover. Manage!

TAC N/C

TAC N/C

PACAF N/C; CSG needs a Dep and Wg/CC an Exec.

MAC N/C

DCO Comments

SAC CSG/CC to Dep Comdr for Support; Wg/CC Base CC.

SAC Small wings should be under old Dual Comdr concept.

SAC CSG/CC to Dep Comdr for Support.

SAC N/C

SAC N/C

SAC N/C

SAC Comm, Base Ops, Wx under DCO. Would solve coord.

SAC N/C

SAC N/C

APPENDIX B-16

Question 6 Cont.

DCO Comments Cont.

SAC N/C
MAC Return to old system; supply under DCM and other under CSG/CC.
PACAF Put stan eval/QC/M&P/Log plans/ops plans/resource plans under Vice Commander.
PACAF N/C
PACAF N/C
PACAF N/C
USAFE CSG/CC to Dep Comdr for Support
USAFE N/C; Maint to TAMS
USAFE N/C; Elim Hqs Sqs and give respons to Dep Comdrs.
USAFE Personnel under DCR; make procurement independent detachment.
TAC Examine DCM & DCR; DCM in production, DCR into more direct actions--repair of AGE, run shops, etc.
TAC N/C
TAC N/C

ADCO Comments

SAC Dual Deputy system preferred.
SAC ATC/Base Ops under DCO
SAC N/C
SAC N/C
SAC N/C
SAC Base Ops under LCM
SAC N/C; There has been too much change.
SAC N/C
SAC N/C; There exists too much Wing guidance.
MAC Civil Engineering under DCM to be with supply.
PACAF N/C: CSG/DE support to me, a tenant, is outstanding.
PACAF N/C

APPENDIX B-17

Question 6 Cont.

ADCO COMMENTS Cont.

USAFE N/C; OMS under Tactical Sq/CC
USAFE N/C; Dispensary under CSG/CC. Operates too independently.
USAFE N/C
TAC N/C
TAC N/C
TAC N/C
TAC N/C
TAC N/C; Further upgrade the position of CSC/CC. Make it one of the avenues to a Wg/CC job. Currently it is not perceived as a route to anywhere but retirement.

DCM Comments

SAC CSG/CC to Dep Comdr for Support; Base CC title is confusing to airmen and junior officers.
SAC CSG/CC to Dep Comdr for Support; Sr. man Base CC.
SAC Supply under DCM.
SAC Eliminate DCR, return to Dual Deputy system.
SAC N/C
SAC N/C
SAC N/C; POL under DCM.
SAC N/C; People make the organization work.
SAC N/C
MAC Eliminate DCR and place functions under CSG/CC, except for TR which should be elevated to Dep Comdr.
MAC N/C
MAC N/C; Change is not improvement--leadership and management count.
PACAF Supply under DCM; Elevate CSG to Wg status (Wing too large); Assign 18TFW & 18 ABW under 313th AD.
PACAF N/C; Authorize Asst. DCM. Elevated DCM is good.

APPENDIX B-18

Question 6 Cont.

DCM Comments Cont.

PACAF	N/C
PACAF	N/C
USAFE	N/C
USAFE	N/C
USAFE	N/C; Don't like TFG Concept where DO and Maint is under TFG.
USAFE	N/C; Change is confusing and lowers efficiency.
TAC	N/C
TAC	N/C
TAC	N/C
TAC	N/C

ADCM Comments

SAC	Supply under DCM (At least POL & A/C parts.)
SAC	Eliminate DCR; CSG/CC to Dep Comdr status.
SAC	N/C
SAC	N/C
SAC	N/C
SAC	N/C
SAC	N/C; Stability is important. Changes confuse and lower efficiency.
MAC	N/C
PACAF	N/C; 18 TFW too big.
PACAF	N/C
USAFE	N/C; Want more authority over people vice that of CSG/CC.
TAC	N/C
TAC	N/C
TAC	N/C; May not be the best but it works.

APPENDIX B-19

Question 6 Cont.

DCR Comments

SAC Personnel under DCR to provide total resource mgt.

SAC Civil Eng under DCR; Comptroller under CSG;
CSG/CC to Dep Comdr; Wg/CC Base CC; add plans to
Wg/CC staff.

SAC N/C

SAC N/C; DCR tied to desk for "nice to have" signatures.

SAC N/C

MAC Go back to old Dual Deputy System

PACAF N/C; 18 TFW DCE creates coord problems. Return
to under CSG/CC.

PACAF N/C

PACAF N/C

PACAF Personnel under DCR.

USAFE Personnel under DCR--overtime/overhires appr by DCR.

USAFE N/C; Establish Sqs within DCR; Eliminate HHq Sqs.

USAFE N/C

USAFE N/C

TAC CSG/CC to Dep Comdr status--CSG no more combat
support than DM or Rm; Manpower Det under DCR to
add manning/people resource.

TAC LGT under CSG; Personnel under DCR; eliminate
conflict Comptroller and CSG/CC over approval of
transportation requests; Make maint sq/ccs O-6s.

TAC N/C; Create DCR, Comptroller and Procurement Sqs.

TAC Civil Engin under DCR for interface with procurement
and supply.

TAC N/C; Create finance, personnel, etc. squadrons.
CCQ Sq too large.

APPENDIX B-20

Question 6 Cont.

ADCR Comments

SAC Base ops under DCO--remaining OTB 'people'" functions be placed under DP.

SAC Base ops under DCO; Comm under DCO; Civil Eng under DCR; CSG/CC to Dep Comdr; Wing CC Base CC.

SAC N/C

SAC N/C

SAC N/C

SAC N/C

MAC N/C

MAC N/C; Establish 2 wings--(1) for C-141 and (1) for C-5.

PACAF N/C; Establish plans under Wg/CC.

USAFE N/C

USAFE N/C

USAFE N/C; HHQ needs to be realigned--establish sqs within DCR; Rename 0046 as Dir of Maint.

TAC N/C; Make Dep Comdrs Groups

TAC N/C; Social actions under CSG/CC.

TAC N/C

TAC N/C; Estab two Hqs Sqs--CSG/CCQ and Wg/CCQ.

CSG/CC Comments

SAC Eliminate DCR--Have held both CSG and DCR jobs.

SAC Eliminate DCR--functions and duties are fragmented and should be consolidated.

SAC N/C

SAC N/C; USAF and MAJCOM staffs need realigning to better conform to Tri-Deputy structure.

SAC N/C; Better define respons of Base CC and Missile Wg/CC

MAC N/C as long as CSG/DCR relationship is good.

APPENDIX B-21

Question 6 Cont.

CSG/CC Comments Cont.

PACAF Eliminate DCR; Functions fragmented.
PACAF N/C; EOD under CSG for new emphasis on disaster preparedness.
USAFE Eliminate DCR; CSG/CC needs dollar decision authority to fulfill support responsibilities.
USAFE Eliminate DCR; Resource job is an integral part of support.
TAC Assign civil engineering and procurement together.
TAC N/C

CSG/CD Comments

SAC Eliminate DCR; Conflict when on same level.
SAC Comptroller, information, and social actions under CSG/CC.
SAC Eliminate DCR; Supply under DCM; Better decision making.
SAC N/C
SAC N/C
SAC N/C
SAC N/C
SAC N/C; Consolidate under CSG those functions not under Dep Comdrs.
MAC LGT under CSG
MAC N/C
PACAF Eliminate DCR
PACAF N/C
USAFE N/C
USAFE DCM under DCO; Hosp under CSG
USAFE Eliminate DCR; Budget and transportation decisions hamper CSG.
USAFE Finance and LGT under CSG; JA under CSG instead of on Wg staff; Supply, procurement and LGX under DCM.

APPENDIX B-22

Question 6 Cont.

CSG/CD Comments Cont.

TAC N/C

TAC Base Ops under DCO

TAC Eliminate DCR; Procurement needs to be assigned with civil engineering.

TAC Base Ops under DCO.

Summary of Respondents

	<u>SAC</u>	<u>MAC</u>	<u>PACAF</u>	<u>USAFE</u>	<u>TAC</u>	<u>TOTAL NO.</u>
Wg/CC	6	1	2	4	7	20
Wg/CV	8	2	4	3	5	22
DCO	10	1	4	4	3	22
ADCO	9	1	2	3	5	20
DCM	9	3	4	4	4	24
ADCM	7	1	2	1	3	14
DCR	5	1	4	4	5	19
ADCR	6	2	1	3	4	16
CSG/CC	5	1	2	3	2	13
CSG/CD	8	2	2	4	4	20
	<u>73</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>190</u>

Changes

For purposes of tabulation, a change was not counted as a major change unless its implementation would appreciably alter the tri-deputy structure. For example, recommended transfer of base operations functions to DCO was not counted as a recommended change. Redesignation of the CSG/CC to deputy commander status was counted as a change as was the movement of major organizations between DCR, DCM, and CSG/CC. Establishment of DCR squadrons or realignment of CCQ squadrons was not counted as a change.

Respondents Not Recommending Change

	<u>SAC</u>	<u>MAC</u>	<u>PACAF</u>	<u>USAFE</u>	<u>TAC</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
No.	47	10	21	26	33	137
%	64.4	66.7	77.8	78.8	78.6	72.1

APPENDIX B-23

Summary of Changes Recommended Most Frequently

<u>No. Replies/%</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>Comd of Origin</u>
16/8.4%	CSG/CC to Dep Comdr	(1) SAC; (1) TAC; (2) USAFE
16/8.4%	Eliminate DCR	(8) SAC; (3) USAFE; (2) PACAF; (1) TAC; (2) MAC
9/4.7%	Supply under DCM	(4) SAC; (3) TAC; (1) PACAF; (!) USAFE
8/4.2%	Eliminate or reduce Hqs Sqs	(4) USAFE; (3) TAC; (1) PACAF
7/3.7%	Base Ops under DCO	(5) SAC; (2) TAC
5/2.6%	Personnel under DCR	(2) USAFE; (1) SAC; (1) PACAF; (1) TAC
5/2.6%	Civil Eng under DCR	(2) SAC; (2) TAC; (1) MAC

% of Respondents Recommending CSG/CC to Deputy Commander

	<u>SAC</u>	<u>MAC</u>	<u>PACAF</u>	<u>USAFE</u>	<u>TAC</u>	<u>% of TOTAL</u>
Wg/CC	50%	0	0	0	0	15%
Wg/CV	50%	0	0	0	0	18.2%
DCO	20%	0	0	25%	0	13.6%
ADCO	0	0	0	0	0	0
DCM	22.2%	0	0	0	0	8.3%
ADCM	0	0	0	100%	0	7.1%
DCR	20%	0	0	0	20%	10.5%
ADCR	16.7%	0	0	0	0	6.3%
CSG/CC	0	0	0	0	0	0
OSG/CD	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	17.8%	0	0	9.1%	2.4%	8.4%
Wg/CC/CV						
DCO, DCM						
DCR	34.2%	0	0	5.3%	4.2%	15.0%
DCO, DCM & DCR	20.8%	0	0	16.7%	8.3%	10.8%

APPENDIX B-24

Question 6 Analysis Cont.

% of Respondents Recommending Elimination of DCR						
	<u>SAC</u>	<u>MAC</u>	<u>PACAF</u>	<u>USAFE</u>	<u>TAC</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Wg/CC	16.7%	0	0	0	0	5.0%
Wg/CV	0	0	0	0	0	00.0
DCO	10.0%	100%	0	0	0	09.9%
ADCO	11.1%	0	0	0	0	5.0%
DCM	0	0	0	0	0	00.0
ADCM	11.1%	0	0	0	0	7.1%
DCR	0	100%	0	0	0	5.3%
ADCR	0	0	0	0	0	0
CSG/CC	40.0%	0	50.0%	66.7%	0	38.5%
CSG/CD	<u>25.0%</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>50.0%</u>	<u>25.0%</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>25.0%</u>
TOTAL	11.0%	13.3%	7.4%	9.1%	0	8.4%